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The purpose of the present article is to consider schizophrenia-the very idea-from the perspective of phenomenological psychopathology, with special attention to the problematic nature of the diagnostic concept as well as to the prospect and challenges inherent in focusing on subjective experience. First, we address historical and philosophical topics relevant to the legitimacy of diagnostic categorization-in general and regarding "schizophrenia" in particular. William James's pragmatist approach to categorization is discussed. Then we offer a version of the well-known basic-self or ipseity-disturbance model (IDM) of schizophrenia, but in a significantly revised form (IDMrevised). The revised model better acknowledges the diverse and even seemingly contradictory nature of schizophrenic symptoms while, at the same time, interpreting these in a more unitary fashion via the key concept of hyperreflexivity-a form of exaggerated self-awareness that tends to undermine normal world-directedness and the stability of self-experience. Particular attention is paid to forms of exaggerated "self-presence" that are sometimes neglected yet imbue classically schizophrenic experiences involving subjectivism or quasi-solipsism and/or all-inclusive or ontological forms of paranoia. We focus on the distinctively paradoxical nature of schizophrenic symptomatology. In concluding we consider precursors in the work of Klaus Conrad, Kimura Bin and Henri Grivois. Finally we defend the concept of schizophrenia by considering its distinctive way of altering certain core aspects of the human condition itself.

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A growing body of research supports the role of self-disorders as core phenotypic features of schizophrenia-spectrum conditions. Self-disorders comprise various alterations of conscious experience whose theoretical understanding continues to present a challenge. This is the second of two articles that aim to clarify the nature of self-disorders in schizophrenia by considering the currently most influential, phenomenological model of schizophrenia: the basic-self-disturbance or ipseity-disorder model (IDM). The previous paper (article 1) presented a state-of-the-art overview of this model and critically assessed its descriptive adequacy with respect to the clinical heterogeneity and variability of the alterations in self- and world-awareness characteristic of schizophrenia. This paper (article 2) proposes a theoretical revision by considering how hyperreflexivity might form the crucial common thread or generating factor that unifies the heterogeneous, and sometimes even contradictory features of schizophrenic self-disorders. We outline implications of our revised model (IDMrevised) for explanatory research, therapeutic practice, and our general understanding of the abnormalities in question.

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A growing body of research supports the role of self-disorders as core phenotypic features of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Self-disorders comprise various alterations of conscious experience whose theoretical understanding continues to present a challenge. The following 2 articles aim to provide further clarification of the nature of self-disorders in schizophrenia by offering a comprehensive review (article 1) and theoretical revision (article 2) of the currently most influential model of altered selfhood in schizophrenia: the basic-self-disturbance or ipseity-disorder model (IDM). This article presents a state-of-the-art overview of the current self-disturbance model and critically assesses its descriptive adequacy with respect to the clinical variability and heterogeneity of the alterations in self- and world-awareness characteristic of schizophrenia. Special attention is paid to experiences of exaggerated basic self, increased "grip" or "hold" on the world, and paradoxical combinations. The next article proposes a theoretical revision of the self-disturbance model by considering how hyperreflexivity might form the crucial common thread or generating factor that unifies the phenomenologically heterogeneous, and sometimes even contradictory features of schizophrenic self-disorders. We outline the implications of our revised model for explanatory research, therapeutic practice, and our general understanding of the abnormalities in question.

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LAY ABSTRACT: Research shows that the way autistic individuals perceive and process sensory stimuli differs from those of non-autistic people. However, while current research often focuses on what sensory differences in autism are and which neurocognitive processes may explain these, it often does not explicitly address what it is like to experience the world through the senses of an autistic person. To explore this understudied dimension, we conducted 18 in-depth interviews with autistic individuals in order to better understand how they personally experienced hypersensitivity from a first-person perspective. Participants described hypersensitivity as a feeling of being bombarded by intrusive stimuli that seemed to invade their bodies and from which they had difficulties distancing themselves. They also indicated how due to hypersensitivity they often perceived their (social) environment as invasive, chaotic, unpredictable or threatening. Hypersensitivities were thus not only described as unsettling bodily experiences but also related to challenges in perceiving, understanding and interacting with the (social) world. By focussing on the subjective dimension of sensory processing in autism, our study thus highlights how sensory difficulties are not peripheral features of autism but play an essential part in the daily challenges faced by autistic individuals.

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BACKGROUND: Delusions in schizophrenia are commonly approached as empirical false beliefs about everyday reality. Phenomenological accounts, by contrast, have suggested that delusions are more adequately understood as pertaining to a different kind of reality experience. How this alteration of reality experience should be characterised, which dimensions of experiential life are involved, and whether delusional reality might differ from standard reality in various ways is unclear and little is known about how patients with delusions value and relate to these experiential alterations. This study aimed to investigate the nature of delusional reality experience, and its subjective apprehension, in individuals with lived experience of delusions and a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis. METHODS: In this qualitative phenomenological study, we recruited individuals with lived experience of delusions and a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis from two psychiatric-hospital services in Belgium using homogenous sampling. Criteria for participation were having undergone at least one psychotic episode with occurring delusional symptoms, present at least 1 year before participation, on the basis of clinical notes assessed by the attending psychiatrist; a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis, ascertained through clinical interview by the attending psychiatrist upon admission; being aged between 18 years and 65 years; and having the capacity to give informed consent. Exclusion criteria included worries concerning capacity to consent and risk of distress caused by participation. We did phenomenologically driven semi-structured interviews with the participants to explore the nature of delusional reality experience and their subjective valuation of these experiences. We used interpretative phenomenological analysis, a qualitative method tailored to the in-depth exploration of participants' first-person perspective, to analyse their accounts. FINDINGS: Between March 2, 2020, and Sept 30, 2020, 18 adults (13 men and five women, aged 19-62 years) participated in the interview study. The findings suggest that delusions are often embedded in wide-ranging alterations of basic reality experience, involving quasi-ineffable atmospheric and ontological qualities that undermine participants' sense of the world as unambiguously real, fully present, and shared with others. We also found that delusional reality experience can differ from standard reality in various ways (ie, in a hypo-real and hyper-real form), across multiple dimensions (eg, meaningfulness, necessity and contingency, and detachment and engagement), and that participants are often implicitly or explicitly aware of the distinction between delusional and standard reality. Delusional experience can have an enduring value and meaning that is not fully captured by a strictly medical perspective. INTERPRETATION: Increased awareness and recognition of the distinctive nature of delusional reality experience, in both clinical and research settings, can improve diagnostic accuracy, explanatory models, and therapeutic support for individuals with delusions whose lived realities are not always evident from an everyday perspective. FUNDING: FWO Flanders. TRANSLATION: For the Dutch translation of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section.

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Delusions are commonly conceived as false beliefs that are held with certainty and which cannot be corrected. This conception of delusion has been influential throughout the history of psychiatry and continues to inform how delusions are approached in clinical practice and in contemporary schizophrenia research. It is reflected in the full psychosis continuum model, guides psychological and neurocognitive accounts of the formation and maintenance of delusions, and it substantially determines how delusions are approached in cognitive-behavioural treatment. In this Review, we draw on a clinical-phenomenological framework to offer an alternative account of delusion that incorporates the experiential dimension of delusion, emphasising how specific alterations to self-consciousness and reality experience underlie delusions that are considered characteristic of schizophrenia. Against that backdrop, we critically reconsider the current research areas, highlighting empirical and conceptual issues in contemporary delusion research, which appear to largely derive from an insufficient consideration of the experiential dimension of delusions. Finally, we suggest how the alternative phenomenological approach towards delusion could offer new ways to advance current research and clinical practice.

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Auditory verbal hallucinations have traditionally especially been researched from a form-based approach, with content getting much less attention. In this article, we argue for the importance of looking at content to get a fuller understanding of the hallucinatory experience. Guided by Lacanian psychoanalysis, we conducted a thematic and a narrative analysis on interviews with 10 schizophrenic patients about their hallucinations. We discerned five themes in the data, which were based on Lacanian theory and had to do with existential questions: parenthood and authority, sexuality and relationships, gender identity, life in the light of death, and what does the other want? Furthermore, we added a theme for unclassified content. Narratively, we found that participants constructed a story of four steps about their hallucinatory experiences. These steps were disturbing events in the past posing an existential question, triggering event, period of confusion, and hearing voices that allude to existential themes. Participants succeed in different degrees in integrating their hallucinatory experiences in their own life history. These stories can be situated on a continuum by making use of three prototypical narrating styles: the meta-delusional, delusional, and chaotic narrative type. Overall, our analysis shows that hallucinations can both be thematically and narratively organized, by making use of a theoretical framework like Lacanian psychoanalysis. Our research demonstrates that hallucinatory contents are not random but are about existential issues imbedded in a life narrative. Future research would benefit of integrating content and form-based approaches.

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In the present essay, we aim to develop and contrast three different positions toward Sellars' distinction between the manifest and scientific images of man: Dennett's philosophical reconstruction of neurocognitive science, contemporary phenomenology and psychoanalysis. We will suggest that these respective traditions and the substantial differences between them can be understood in terms of a 'logic of appearance.' Related to this are differing ideas about the rights and limits of the first-person perspective, the relation between conscious experience and belief, and the issue of naturalization. In the final part, we will try to specify, on the basis of a detailed reading of the disagreement between Dennett and phenomenology, in what way psychoanalytic theory could respond to these different issues.

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The classical symptom specificity hypothesis (Blatt, 1974) particularly associates obsessional symptoms to interpersonal behavior directed at autonomy and separation from others. Cross-sectional group research, however, has yielded inconsistent findings on this predicted association, and a previous empirical case study (Cornelis et al., in press; see Chapter 2) documented obsessional pathology to be rooted in profound ambivalences between autonomous and dependent interpersonal dynamics. Therefore, in the present empirical case study, concrete operationalizations of the classical symptom specificity hypothesis are contrasted to alternative hypotheses based on the observed complexities in Chapter 2. Dynamic associations between obsessional symptoms and interpersonal functioning is further explored, aiming at further contribution to theory building (i.e., through suggestions for potential hypothesis-refinement; Stiles, 2009). Similar to the first empirical case study (Chapter 1), Consensual Qualitative Research for Case studies is used to quantitatively and qualitatively describe the longitudinal, clinical interplay between obsessional symptoms and interpersonal dynamics throughout the process of supportive-expressive psychodynamic therapy. In line with findings from Chapter 1, findings reveal close associations between obsessions and interpersonal dynamics, and therapist interventions focusing on interpersonal conflicts are documented as related to interpersonal and symptomatic alterations. Observations predominantly accord to the ambivalence-hypothesis rather than to the classical symptom specificity hypothesis. Yet, meaningful differences are observed in concrete manifestations of interpersonal ambivalences within significant relationships. Findings are again discussed in light of conceptual and methodological considerations; and limitations and future research indications are addressed.

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In the present essay, we aim to develop an expressivist reading of the phenomenon of first-person authority and the adverbial meaning of unconsciousness. In the first part, Wittgenstein's grammatical remarks on the asymmetry between the first -and third-persons in psychological self-ascriptions are developed as an alternative to detectivist explanations according to which first-person authority is to be regarded as a matter of epistemic accomplishment. In the second part, this expressivist account will be used to propose a non-epistemic analysis of the meaning of unconsciousness and to offer a critical discussion of both Freud's and Lacan's respective readings of the unconscious. Regarding the latter, we will reject the idea that the concept of the unconscious (i) necessitates the introduction of a (Cartesian) "subject of the unconscious" and (ii) could be deduced from the paradoxes of first-personal reference.

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Starting from the theories of leading psychiatrists, like Kraepelin and de Clérambault, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) formulated an original theory of psychosis, focusing on the subject and on the structuring role of language. In particular, he postulated that language makes up the experience of subjectivity and that psychosis is marked by the absence of a crucial metaphorization process. Interestingly, in contemporary psychiatry there is growing empirical evidence that schizophrenia is characterized by abnormal interpretation of verbal and non-verbal information, with a great difficulty to put such information in the appropriate context. Neuro-scientific contributions have investigated this difficulty suggesting the possibility of interpreting schizophrenia as a semiotic disorder which makes the patients incapable of understanding the figurative meaning of the metaphoric speech, probably due to a dysfunction of certain right hemisphere areas, such as the right temporoparietal junction and the right superior/middle temporal gyrus. In this paper we first review the Lacanian theory of psychosis and neuro-scientific research in the field of symbolization and metaphoric speech. Next, we discuss possible convergences between both approaches, exploring how they might join and inspire one another. Clinical and neurophysiological research implications are discussed.