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Humans and other animals live in dynamic environments. To reliably manipulate the environment and attain their goals they would benefit from a constant modification of motor-responding based on responses' current effect on the current environment. It is argued that this is exactly what is achieved by a mechanism that reinforces responses which have led to accurate sensorimotor predictions. We further show that evaluations of a response's effectiveness can occur simultaneously, driven by at least two different processes, each relying on different statistical properties of the feedback and affecting a different level of responding. Specifically, we show the continuous effect of (a) a sensorimotor process sensitive only to the conditional probability of effects given that the agent acted on the environment (i.e., action-effects) and of (b) a more abstract judgement or inference that is also sensitive to the conditional probabilities of occurrence of feedback given no action by the agent (i.e., inaction-effects). The latter process seems to guide action selection (e.g., should I act?) while the former the manner of the action's execution. This study is the first to show that different evaluation processes of a response's effectiveness influence different levels of responding.

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Automatic imitation refers to the act of unintentionally mimicking observed actions. Inspired by a theoretical framework that allows for controlled yet unintentional processes, we tested whether automatic imitation depends on the task relevance of the to-be-imitated movements. Replicating previous results, we find that movements that are part of the participant's task set unintentionally influence response. Our key finding is that participants generally do not imitate similar and highly familiar movements that are not part of the task set and hence are task-irrelevant. Furthermore, the results of computational data modeling are consistent with the notion that task-relevance modulates the mental activation of information, as posited by the above theoretical framework. Our findings are not predicted and cannot be explained using current accounts of automatic imitation, such as Associative Sequence Learning or Theory of Event Coding. At a broader level, the key contribution of this study is in challenging the empirical basis for automatic imitation by showing that the effects interpreted as imitation occur only for task relevant responses. This pattern lends itself to a different interpretation which is not related to imitation, automatic or otherwise, but rather to the general phenomenon of response compatibility effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

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While known reinforcers of behavior are outcomes that are valuable to the organism, recent research has demonstrated that the mere occurrence of an own-response effect can also reinforce responding. In this paper we begin investigating whether these two types of reinforcement occur via the same mechanism. To this end, we modified two different tasks, previously established to capture the influence of a response's effectiveness on the speed of motor-responses (indexed here by participants' reaction times). Specifically, in six experiments we manipulated both a response's 'pure' effectiveness and its outcome value (e.g., substantial versus negligible monetary reward) and measured the influence of both on the speed of responding. The findings strongly suggest that post action selection, responding is influenced only by pure effectiveness, as assessed by the motor system; thus, at these stages responding is not sensitive to abstract representations of the value of a response (e.g., monetary value). We discuss the benefit of distinguishing between these two necessary aspects of adaptive behavior namely, fine-tuning of motor-control and striving for desired outcomes. Finally, we embed the findings in the recently proposed Control-based response selection (CBRS) framework and elaborate on its potential for understanding motor-learning processes in developing infants.

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An important model for explaining humans' feeling of agency-the Comparator model-draws on ideas used to explain effective motor control. The model describes how our brain estimates the degree of control over the environment offered by a specific motor program (in short, an action's effectiveness). However, given its current level of specification, the model is at best vague on how (or even whether) the prediction of effectiveness of an action is dynamically updated. To test the issue empirically, our participants performed multiple experimental blocks of a task (reliably shown to measure reinforcement from effectiveness) in which blocks with and without action-effects (or with spatially unpredictable feedback) were interlaced. This design creates a sinusoidal-like objective increase or decrease in effectiveness (quantified as the n-trials back probability of receiving feedback), which participants were unable to report. As previously found, response speed indexed reinforcement from effectiveness. The results suggest that reinforcement from effectiveness is sensitive to both the degree and trend of effectiveness; that is, reinforcement is sensitive to whether it is increasing, decreasing, or is unchanged. Given the previous links made between reinforcement from effectiveness and the computation of effectiveness by the motor-system, the results are the first to show an online, dynamic and complex sensitivity to a motor-programs' effectiveness that is directly translated to its production. The importance of testing the so-called sense of agency in a dynamic environment and the implications of the current findings for a dominant model of the sense of agency are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

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This study examined the role of advance expectations in generating relevance-based selection, using a version of cognitive "blindness" that is driven solely by task relevance. With this irrelevance-induced blindness, participants often fail to report a feature of an irrelevant stimulus, even though the levels of perceptual and cognitive load are minimal (i.e., capacity limitations are not met). Hence, with this phenomenon, selection is based solely on task relevance. In two experiments, we examined such relevance-based selection with a new paradigm in which the participants had to report the location of an object appearing on one of two rings. Critically, while in Experiment 1 the participants could form advance expectations regarding the (ir) relevant stimuli, because the location of the relevant ring and the shape and color of the relevant object were known in advance, in Experiment 2 no concrete advance expectations could be formed. This was established by varying randomly, from trial to trial, the shape, color, and location of relevant and irrelevant stimuli. We found strong irrelevance-induced blindness in both experiments, regardless of whether or not advance expectations were formed. These findings suggest that advance expectations, at least with regard to the task-relevant stimulus' location shape or color, are not necessary for irrelevance-induced blindness to occur; more generally, this implies that such expectations do not play a critical role in selection processes that are based solely on task relevance. We further discuss these findings in the context of Garnerian and Posnerian selection, and their relationship to visual awareness.

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As our environment is frequently changing, it is common that our expectations are violated by unexpected stimuli or events, which leaves us uncertain about which pieces of information will be useful in the future. It is unclear how an expectation violation affects the subsequent control settings for processing of information. The current study directly addressed this issue by employing a double-surprise-trial paradigm based on the attribute amnesia task (Chen & Wyble, 2015a). In Experiment 1, participants were asked to report the location of a target letter presented among distractor digits on several trials and were then unexpectedly asked to report a different attribute (color or identity) of the target letter. In the next trial, participants were asked another unexpected question about the other attribute (identity or color respectively). The results show that, despite participants' poor performance in the first surprise trial, which replicated the attribute amnesia effect, their memory performance in the second surprise trial was dramatically improved, even when the probed attribute was different from that of the first surprise trial. This was also true in Experiment 2, where 15 trials were inserted between the two surprise trials. Experiment 3 further clarified that this effect is not triggered by the mere presence of a surprise test, but rather the violation of expectation about the nature of a surprise test. These results suggest the operation of an adaptive control mechanism that reduces the selectivity of processing in the face of unexpected events. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

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How is our strategy for forming memories shaped by experience with a task? Previous work using surprise questions (i.e., unexpected by the participant) has shown a remarkable inability to report attributes of an attended target in a search display. This representational poverty presumably reflects a form of information exploitation, in which control processes specialize the conversion of available information into memory representations. We hypothesize that such control is refined by repeated experience with a task, and as a result, memory representations will specialize as task experience accrues, such that report accuracy for an unexpected question will progressively worsen as the number of preceding trials increases. To test this, subjects were asked to report the location of a letter among three digits. The ability to respond correctly to a surprise question about the identity of that letter became worse as the experiment progressed. A follow-up study evaluated whether this incremental worsening of report accuracy could be explained as a buildup of proactive interference by varying the set of letters for the surprise test. The results were unchanged relative to the original experiment, which argues against a primary contribution of proactive interference in the worsening performance. The effect was replicated in a similar paradigm using color disks. These findings illustrate that repeated performance of a prescriptive task engages an adaptive modification of control processes that focus information processing on specific attributes of a stimulus that are expected to be necessary in the future, regardless of their immediate task relevance.

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Many models of emotion assume that the emotional response is preceded by an assessment of a stimulus' relevance to the perceiver's goals. Although widely assumed, experimentally controlling and, hence, empirically testing the effect of a stimulus' relevance on the emotional response has proven challenging. In this study, we used stimuli with high ecological validity and manipulated their relevance while holding constant the perceptual features of the stimuli. In the experiment, participants were given the result of their Israeli Psychometric Entrance Test (PET). The PET score is highly relevant to most participants, as, at the time of the experiment, it is the only unknown about whether they shall be admitted to their major of choice at the university. Relevance of the information was experimentally controlled both binarily by manipulating whether the presented score is the participant's or belongs to another unfamiliar participant and parametrically by manipulating the probability that a presented score is their actual PET score. We found a substantial effect for manipulated relevance on self-report, electrodermal activity, and heart rate. The results provide evidence that information about a stimulus' relevance modulates the emotional response to it. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

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We contrast two theoretical positions on the relation between phenomenal and access consciousness. First, we discuss previous data supporting a mild Overflow position, according to which transient visual awareness can overflow report. These data are open to two interpretations: (i) observers transiently experience specific visual elements outside attentional focus without encoding them into working memory; (ii) no specific visual elements but only statistical summaries are experienced in such conditions. We present new data showing that under data-limited conditions observers cannot discriminate a simple relation (same versus different) without discriminating the elements themselves and, based on additional computational considerations, we argue that this supports the first interpretation: summary statistics (same/different) are grounded on the transient experience of elements. Second, we examine recent data from a variant of 'inattention blindness' and argue that contrary to widespread assumptions, it provides further support for Overflow by highlighting another factor, 'task relevance', which affects the ability to conceptualize and report (but not experience) visual elements.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

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The sense of agency (SoA) is defined as "the registration that I am the initiator of my actions." Both "direct" and "indirect" measurement of SoA has focused on specific contextualized perceptual events, however it has also been demonstrated that "higher level" cognitions seemingly affect the SoA. We designed a measure of person's general, context-free beliefs about having core agency-the Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS). An exploratory (EFA) and confirmatory (CFA) factor analyses on samples of 236 (Study 1) and 408 (Study 2) participants yielded two correlated factors we labeled Sense of Positive Agency (SoPA) and Sense of Negative Agency (SoNA). The construct validity of SoAS is demonstrated by its low-to-moderate correlations with conceptually relevant tools and by the moderate-strong relationship between the SoNA subscale and obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms (r = 0.35). We conclude that the SoAS seems to isolate people's general beliefs in their agency from their perceived success in obtaining outcomes.

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How does information about one's control over the environment (e.g., having an own-action effect) influence motivation? The control-based response selection framework was proposed to predict and explain such findings. Its key tenant is that control relevant information modulates both the frequency and speed of responses by determining whether a perceptual event is an outcome of one's actions or not. To test this framework empirically, the current study examines whether and how temporal and spatial contiguity/predictability-previously established as being important for one's sense of agency-modulate motivation from control. In 5 experiments, participants responded to a cue, potentially triggering a perceptual effect. Temporal (Experiments 1a-c) and spatial (Experiments 2a and b) contiguity/predictability between actions and their potential effects were experimentally manipulated. The influence of these control-relevant factors was measured, both indirectly (through their effect on explicit judgments of agency) and directly on response time and response frequency. The pattern of results was highly consistent with the control-based response selection framework in suggesting that control relevant information reliably modulates the impact of "having an effect" on different levels of action selection. We discuss the implications of this study for the notion of motivation from control and for the empirical work on the sense of agency. (PsycINFO Database Record

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We demonstrate that task relevance dissociates between visual awareness and knowledge activation to create a state of seeing without knowing-visual awareness of familiar stimuli without recognizing them. We rely on the fact that in order to experience a Kanizsa illusion, participants must be aware of its inducers. While people can indicate the orientation of the illusory rectangle with great ease (signifying that they have consciously experienced the illusion's inducers), almost 30% of them could not report the inducers' color. Thus, people can see, in the sense of phenomenally experiencing, but not know, in the sense of recognizing what the object is or activating appropriate knowledge about it. Experiment 2 tests whether relevance-based selection operates within objects and shows that, contrary to the pattern of results found with features of different objects in our previous studies and replicated in Experiment 1, selection does not occur when both relevant and irrelevant features belong to the same object. We discuss these findings in relation to the existing theories of consciousness and to attention and inattentional blindness, and the role of cognitive load, object-based attention, and the use of self-reports as measures of awareness.

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Faces are one of the most important signals for reading people's mental states. In sync with their apparent "chronic" (cross-situational) relevance, faces have been argued to be processed independently of the task one is currently performing. Many of these demonstrations have involved "capture of attention" or increased interference by faces functioning as distractors. Here we ask whether multiple repetitions of task irrelevant faces leave a trace in the system. Specifically, we tested whether repeating structures instantiated by task irrelevant faces are unintentionally or implicitly learned. Our findings indicate that although faces are indeed unique in that they are the only stimulus found to lead to implicit learning of complex rules when irrelevant, such learning is small in magnitude. Although these results support the conjecture that task irrelevant faces are processed, the functional significance of this learning needs to be assessed.

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We argue that it is possible to go beyond the "selfish goal" metaphor and make an even stronger case for the role of unconscious motivation in cognition and action. Through the relevance of a representation (ROAR) framework, we describe how not only value motivation, which relates to "selfish goals," but also truth motivation and control motivation impact cognition and action.

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Learning the structure of the environment (e.g., what usually follows what) enables animals to behave in an effective manner and prepare for future events. Unintentional learning is capable of efficiently producing such knowledge as has been demonstrated with the Artificial Grammar Learning paradigm (AGL), among others. It has been argued that selective attention is a necessary and sufficient condition for visual implicit learning. Experiment 1 shows that spatial attention is not sufficient for implicit learning. Learning does not occur if the stimuli instantiating the structure are task irrelevant. In a second experiment, we demonstrate that this holds even with abundance of available attentional resources. Together, these results challenge the current view of the relations between attention, resources, and implicit learning.

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To what degree does our representation of the immediate world depend solely on its relevance to what we are currently doing? We examined whether relevance per se can cause "blindness," even when there is no resource limitation. In a novel paradigm, people looked at a colored circle surrounded by a differently colored ring-the task relevance of which was previously manipulated-and were subsequently asked to identify these colors. Whereas knowledge of the task-relevant color was near perfect, up to a quarter of the participants could not name the color of the irrelevant stimulus, even though a control experiment indicated there were sufficient resources to process both stimuli. The results are a first demonstration of blindness when mental resources are clearly available and challenge attentional theories predicting strong selection only when resources are taxed.

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Human motivation is sensitive to value-to the outcomes of actions. People invest mental and physical resources for obtaining desired results or for stopping and reversing undesired ones. Accordingly, people's motivation is sensitive to information about their standing in relation to outcome attainment ('outcome feedback'). In this paper, we argue and present the first evidence for the existence of another motivational sensitivity in humans-a sensitivity to our degree of control on the environment and hence to information about that control ('control feedback'). We show that when actions have even trivial and constant perceptual effects, participants' motivation to perform is enhanced. We then show that increased motivation is not because more information about task performance is available and that motivation is increased only in conditions in which control over the effects can be firmly established by the mind. We speculate on the implications for understanding motivation, and potentially, physical and mental health.

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In their paper: "Learning of Predictive Relations Between Events Depends on Attention, Not on Awareness" Custers & Aarts demonstrate that when one is first exposed to a clear predictive relationship - a consequent predictive relationship will be represented as a unidirectional association ("predictor" to "predicted") in the percievers' minds regardless of their awareness of that relationship. Furthermore, a conscious intention to learn the relationship leads to the formation of a bidirectional (non-predictive) association. While these findings may prove to be a significant step in understanding other forms of implicit learning such as implicit artificial grammar learning and implicit sequence learning and why they are affected by intentional learning; Custers & Aarts' postulation that "top-down" regulation is at work here is debatable as their experimental manipulation can be understood as "bottom-up" activation of implicit learning processes.

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The notion of accessibility of mental representations has been invaluable in explaining and predicting human thought and action. Focusing on social cognition, we review the large corpus of data that has accumulated since the first models of mental activation dynamics were outlined. We then outline a framework that we call Relevance of a Representation (or ROAR for short), the main tenant of which is that not all stimulated representations are in fact activated (i.e., influence thought and action processes). More specifically, we propose that the degree to which a representation is available to processes of thought and action is a function of that representation's motivational relevance. We end by demonstrating how the framework enables re-addressing the notions of accessibility, automaticity and selective attention.

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This investigation used a newly developed artificial grammar learning (AGL) paradigm in which participants were exposed to sequences of stimuli that varied in two dimensions (colours and letters) that were superimposed on each other. Variation within each dimension was determined by a different grammar. The results of two studies strongly suggest that implicit learning in AGL depends on the goal relevance of the to-be-learned dimension. Specifically, when only one of the two stimulus dimensions was relevant for their task (Experiment 1) participants learned the structure underlying the relevant, but not that of the irrelevant dimension. However, when both dimensions were relevant, both structures were learned (Experiment 2). These findings suggest that implicit learning occurs only in dimensions to which we are attuned. Based on the present results and on those of Eitam, Hassin, and Schul (2008) we suggest that focusing on goal relevance may provide new insights into the mechanisms underlying implicit learning.

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