RESUMEN

This study examined the interaction between speech perception and lexical information among a group of 7-year-old children, of which 26 were poor readers and 36 were good readers. The children's performance was examined on tasks assessing reading skill, phonological awareness, pseudoword repetition, and phoneme identification. Although good readers showed clearly defined categorical perception in the phoneme identification task for both the /bif/-/pif/ and the /bis/-/pis/ continua, the category boundary for /bif/-/pif/ was at longer VOTs than the boundary for /bis/-/pis/, which characterizes the classic lexicality effect. Poor readers showed less sharply defined categorical perception on both continua. Although poor readers did not show the classic lexicality effect, lexicality did affect the overall rate with which phonemes were identified as /b/ or /p/ at each VOT. These findings suggest that the lexicon may operate as a compensatory mechanism for resolving ambiguities in speech perception. Furthermore, statistical correction for group differences in phoneme identification made group differences in phoneme deletion disappear, suggesting that deficits in speech perception may play a causal role in the phonological core deficit associated with reading failure.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

What is the relation between metaphors and similes? Aristotle's "comparison theory" holds that metaphors are elliptical similes: "Sam is a pig" is simply a short form of "Sam is like a pig." In contrast, it has been suggested that metaphors cannot be elliptical similes because metaphors are "stronger" than similes. We know metaphors are stronger, it is argued, because of examples involving corrections, such as "Peter is not just like a rock, he is a rock." The argument from corrections can be challenged on logical and empirical grounds. The ability to correct a simile with a metaphor does not entail that metaphors are stronger than similes when used on their own, which is likely to be the most frequent case. Although four experiments indicate that when corrections are involved, metaphors are indeed stronger than similes in several respects, alas a further four experiments indicate that these differences are largely eliminated when metaphors and similes are used on their own. We note that this pattern of results is consistent with the comparison theory, and we offer an explanation of the effects of corrections.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Why might we sometimes prefer a metaphor such as "genes are blueprints" to a simile such as "genes are like blueprints"? One possibility is that metaphors are preferred when the comparison between a tenor (e.g., genes) and a vehicle (e.g., blueprints) seems especially apt. That is, metaphors might be used when the comparison captures many salient features of the tenor in question. The present experiments examined the relation between the aptness of comparisons and people's preferences for expressing those comparisons as metaphors or as similes. In Experiment 1, it was found that there is consensus on how to express particular comparisons. In Experiment 2, it was found that this preference can be predicted from the aptness of a comparison. It was also found that aptness can predict errors in the recall of comparisons. These findings have implications for theories of metaphor.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

When a word that was a to-be-ignored flanker on an initial prime trial becomes the target on the subsequent probe trial, responding to that word on the probe trial is slowed, a phenomenon callednegative priming. Virtually all prior studies have required subjects to perform the same task on both the prime and the probe trials. Thus, the extent to which negative priming is task bound is uncertain. We manipulated task factorially on the prime and probe trials, resulting in four groups: name-name, name-categorize, categorize-name, and categorize-categorize. The results showed equivalent negative priming of about 22 msec both within and between tasks for identical words, but no negative priming for semantically related words from the same category. These findings suggest (1) that negative priming for identical words can readily cross task types; and (2) that semantic negative priming does not occur for words, at least when categorical relatedness alone determines the semantic relation.