RESUMEN
Water resources can be soon exhausted with the overdeveloped industrialization. High-water-consumption (HWC) industries and their supply chains are trying to reduce water consumption in the production process. These water-saving behaviors and effects may be subsidized by the government to pursue the goal of social welfare maximization (SWM). In this context, to investigate when to bring in government subsidy for any water-saving behaviors and effects to maximize the social welfare, six game-theoretical decision models for the water-saving supply chain under three scenarios are developed, analyzed, and compared, and the corresponding numerical and sensitivity analyses of water-saving case in the papermaking industry are conducted and compared; on this basis, the corresponding policy implications and managerial insights are discussed and summarized in this article. The research results indicate that the supply chain would only have internal incentive to implement water-saving management under low- or medium-cost case, while the government would only have external incentive to subsidize water-saving behaviors and effects under medium-cost case. Besides, the coordination strategy outperforms the equilibrium strategy regarding the water-saving effects, operational performances, social welfare, consumer surplus, and positive externality for the water-saving supply chain under all three scenarios. Furthermore, a kind of niche targeting subsidy policy based on actual water-saving effect that the government only subsidizes the water-saving supply chain operating under coordination strategy with medium water-saving cost structure can achieve social welfare maximization, operational performance improvement, and positive externality enhancement. PRACTITIONER POINTS: The optimal interval for internal incentives of water-saving is explored. The optimal interval for government subsidies of water-saving is investigated. The optimal operational strategy for the water-saving supply chain is examined.
Asunto(s)
Motivación , Agua , Financiación Gubernamental , Industrias , Recursos HídricosRESUMEN
Often enough, social welfare and private benefit do not align for quasi-public goods/services. The inter-basin water transfer (IBWT) project provides a vivid example of this. In this paper, following the game-theoretical approach, we derive an optimal Ramsey pricing scheme to resolve these conflicts. We try to compare traditional supply chain management models with an optimal Ramsey pricing scheme, with an enforcement of coordination among firms. Using simulation techniques, we compute numerical estimates under three regimes: a standard equilibrium decision framework, a coordination decision model and a coordinated Ramsey pricing scheme. Our results show the relative welfare impact of different settings, revealing that the optimal pricing scheme based on the two-part tariff structure cannot only improve social welfare, but also ensure a target profit for participating firms. Lastly, our findings have strong policy implications for the government with profit regulation and the control of water resources.