RESUMEN
Municipal household waste management (MHWM) is crucial for urban governance and sustainable development. Currently, Chinese governments at all levels are making great effort to implement MHWM through waste classification and recycling (WCR). However, the major participants in WCR, such as urban residents, property management companies and government departments, may act in their self-interest and hinder the MHWM goals. Therefore, it has become an imperative initiative to promote MHWM by effectively coordinate their conflicts of interest. Considering that external factors with complexity and uncertainty may also affect participants' behaviors, we develop a stochastic tripartite evolutionary game to model behavioral interaction of the three participants. Then we derive theoretical results and simulate different scenarios to examine the effects of key factors on participants' strategy evolution. The results show that stochastic interference, cost reduction and rules simplification contribute to WCR of MHWM, and reward and performance improvement benefits have different incentive effects. Moreover, credit-based punishment and disclosure of non-compliance are more effective than financial-based penalty. To promote MHWM, policymakers should not only simplify classification rules, lower participation cost and enhance credit-based punishment system, but also encourage anonymous report and apply well-designed financial-based incentive and penalty.
Asunto(s)
Administración de Residuos , Humanos , Administración de Residuos/métodos , Reciclaje/métodos , Gobierno , Motivación , Residuos Sólidos/análisisRESUMEN
Understanding homeowners' energy-efficiency retrofit (EER) decision-making is a critical priority for reducing the adverse environmental impacts of the building sector and promoting a sustainable consumption transition. Existing research lacks attention to the dynamics and social interactions in the decision-making process of homeowner EER adoption. This paper applies the complex network-based evolutionary game approach with agent-based modeling to construct an evolutionary dynamics model for homeowners' EER adoption decision-making. Through simulation experiments, this paper examines the effects of various key factors, including government incentives, retrofit costs, retrofit uncertainty, and network size, on the evolution of EER adoption. The results suggest that government incentives facilitate EER adoption, but their effects require a sufficiently long period of policy implementation and extensive social interaction to be realized. Reducing retrofit costs is a robust and effective way to encourage EER adoption, especially when uncertainty is high. Retrofit uncertainty has a significant impact on the adoption evolution. Increased uncertainty can hinder adoption decisions. In particular, the combination of high uncertainty and incentives is prone to lead to incentive failure. The increase in network size contributes to EER adoption, but attention needs to be paid to the impact of potential incentive redundancy in large-scale networks.
Asunto(s)
IncertidumbreRESUMEN
China's household solid waste recycling system has long faced the challenge of recycling formalization. This process is affected by the complexity of the interdependence of the recycler and resident decisions. The aim of this study was to gain a better understanding of the coevolution of residents' and recyclers' recycling decisions. To this end, this study applied agent-based modeling and network-based evolutionary game methods to construct evolutionary game models based on a two-layer social network. The two layers of heterogeneous social networks depicted the connections between residents and recyclers, respectively. Residents and recyclers choose either formal or informal recycling strategies within layers according to evolutionary game theory. Waste flows and cash flows underlie the interdependent coevolution between the two layers. Using this model, the effects of resident subsidies, recycler subsidies, and regulatory policies on the coevolution of residents and recyclers were simulated. The results showed that the impact of policies on recycling systems relies on long-term social interaction. The trends in the strategic evolution of residents and recyclers were similar, and emerged from their interdependence and mutual influence. Resident-oriented subsidy incentives can promote formal recycling stably and positively. However, recycler subsidies and regulatory policies have opposite marginal promotion effects, as is reflected by the fact that the evolution of formal recycling is insensitive to high recycler subsidies and sensitive to high-intensity regulatory policies. These findings provide a more comprehensive insight into the development of recycling systems and inform the design of waste management policies.
Asunto(s)
Residuos Sólidos , Administración de Residuos , Residuos Sólidos/análisis , Administración de Residuos/métodos , Reciclaje/métodosRESUMEN
An improved understanding of how policies can promote the diffusion of electric vehicles (EVs) is critical to achieving sustainable development. Previous studies of EV diffusion dynamics have paid insufficient attention to consumer preferences. In this paper, a network-based evolutionary game model considering dynamic consumer preference is constructed to study EV diffusion. Through numerical experiments, the evolutionary processes and results of various promotion policies, including carbon taxes, production subsidies, purchase subsidies, and information policy on EV diffusion, are simulated. In particular, this paper explores the differentiated effects of supply-side policies and demand-side policies. The simulation results indicate that: (1) The effectiveness of promotion policies is sensitive to the size of the manufacturer network, and large networks can dampen periodical fluctuations in diffusion rates. (2) Supply-side carbon taxes and subsidies facilitate a steady diffusion of EVs. However, compared with the sustained effectiveness of subsidies, carbon taxes may inhibit the rapid penetration of EVs. (3) Implementing purchase subsidies in the early stages of diffusion is more effective than production subsidies, but the potential uncertainty of demand-side subsidies should be noted. (4) The impact of information policy on the evolutionary trend of EV diffusion is pronounced but is a longer-term impact, requiring a long enough implementation horizon.