RESUMEN
In March 2021, Emergency Intake Sites (EIS) were created to address capacity shortfalls during a surge of Unaccompanied Children at the Mexico-United States land border. The COVID-19 Zone Plan (ZP) was developed to decrease COVID-19 transmission. COVID-19 cumulative percent (%) positivity was analyzed to evaluate the impact of the ZP, venue type and bed capacity across EIS from April 1-May 31, 2021. Results: Of 11 EIS sites analyzed, 54% implemented the recommended ZP. The overall % positivity was 2.47% (95% CI 2.39-2.55). The % positivity at EIS with the ZP, 1.83% (95% CI 1.71-1.95), was lower than that at EIS without the ZP, 2.83%, ( 95% CI 2.72-2.93), and showed a lower 7-day moving average of % positivity. Conclusion: Results showed a possible effect of the ZP on % positivity when controlling for venue type and bed capacity in a specific EIS group comparison, indicating that all three variables could have had effect on % positivity. They also showed that smaller intake facilities may be recommendable during public health emergencies.
Asunto(s)
COVID-19 , Niño , Humanos , Estados Unidos/epidemiología , Cuarentena/métodos , Salud Pública , México , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S.RESUMEN
Yellow fever virus is a mosquito-borne flavivirus that causes yellow fever, an acute infectious disease that occurs in South America and sub-Saharan Africa. Most patients with yellow fever are asymptomatic, but among the 15% who develop severe illness, the case fatality rate is 20%-60%. Effective live-attenuated virus vaccines are available that protect against yellow fever (1). An outbreak of yellow fever began in Brazil in December 2016; since July 2017, cases in both humans and nonhuman primates have been reported from the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro, including cases occurring near large urban centers in these states (2). On January 16, 2018, the World Health Organization updated yellow fever vaccination recommendations for Brazil to include all persons traveling to or living in Espírito Santo, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro states, and certain cities in Bahia state, in addition to areas where vaccination had been recommended before the recent outbreak (3). Since January 2018, 10 travel-related cases of yellow fever, including four deaths, have been reported in international travelers returning from Brazil. None of the 10 travelers had received yellow fever vaccination.
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Brotes de Enfermedades , Enfermedad Relacionada con los Viajes , Fiebre Amarilla/diagnóstico , Adulto , Brasil/epidemiología , Resultado Fatal , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Fiebre Amarilla/epidemiologíaRESUMEN
Background: Zika virus has spread rapidly in the Americas and has been imported into many nonendemic countries by travelers. Objective: To describe clinical manifestations and epidemiology of Zika virus disease in travelers exposed in the Americas. Design: Descriptive, using GeoSentinel records. Setting: 63 travel and tropical medicine clinics in 30 countries. Patients: Ill returned travelers with a confirmed, probable, or clinically suspected diagnosis of Zika virus disease seen between January 2013 and 29 February 2016. Measurements: Frequencies of demographic, trip, and clinical characteristics and complications. Results: Starting in May 2015, 93 cases of Zika virus disease were reported. Common symptoms included exanthema (88%), fever (76%), and arthralgia (72%). Fifty-nine percent of patients were exposed in South America; 71% were diagnosed in Europe. Case status was established most commonly by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing of blood and less often by PCR testing of other body fluids or serology and plaque-reduction neutralization testing. Two patients developed Guillain-Barré syndrome, and 3 of 4 pregnancies had adverse outcomes (microcephaly, major fetal neurologic abnormalities, and intrauterine fetal death). Limitation: Surveillance data collected by specialized clinics may not be representative of all ill returned travelers, and denominator data are unavailable. Conclusion: These surveillance data help characterize the clinical manifestations and adverse outcomes of Zika virus disease among travelers infected in the Americas and show a need for global standardization of diagnostic testing. The serious fetal complications observed in this study highlight the importance of travel advisories and prevention measures for pregnant women and their partners. Travelers are sentinels for global Zika virus circulation and may facilitate further transmission. Primary Funding Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, International Society of Travel Medicine, and Public Health Agency of Canada.
Asunto(s)
Vigilancia de Guardia , Viaje , Infección por el Virus Zika/epidemiología , Adolescente , Adulto , Anciano , Región del Caribe/epidemiología , América Central/epidemiología , Niño , Preescolar , Femenino , Síndrome de Guillain-Barré/epidemiología , Síndrome de Guillain-Barré/virología , Humanos , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Embarazo , Complicaciones Infecciosas del Embarazo/epidemiología , Complicaciones Infecciosas del Embarazo/virología , América del Sur/epidemiología , Adulto Joven , Infección por el Virus Zika/complicacionesRESUMEN
Zika virus belongs to the genus Flavivirus of the family Flaviviridae; it is transmitted to humans primarily through the bite of an infected Aedes species mosquito (e.g., Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus) (1). Zika virus has been identified as a cause of congenital microcephaly and other serious brain defects (2). As of June 30, 2016, CDC had issued travel notices for 49 countries and U.S. territories across much of the Western hemisphere (3), including Brazil, where the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Games of the XXXI Olympiad, also known as Rio 2016; Games) will be hosted in Rio de Janeiro in August and September 2016. During the Games, mosquito-borne Zika virus transmission is expected to be low because August and September are winter months in Brazil, when cooler and drier weather typically reduces mosquito populations (4). CDC conducted a risk assessment to predict those countries susceptible to ongoing Zika virus transmission resulting from introduction by a single traveler to the Games. Whereas all countries are at risk for travel-associated importation of Zika virus, CDC estimated that 19 countries currently not reporting Zika outbreaks have the environmental conditions and population susceptibility to sustain mosquito-borne transmission of Zika virus if a case were imported from infection at the Games. For 15 of these 19 countries, travel to Rio de Janeiro during the Games is not estimated to increase substantially the level of risk above that incurred by the usual aviation travel baseline for these countries. The remaining four countries, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Yemen, are unique in that they do not have a substantial number of travelers to any country with local Zika virus transmission, except for anticipated travel to the Games. These four countries will be represented by a projected, combined total of 19 athletes (plus a projected delegation of about 60 persons), a tiny fraction of the 350,000-500,000 visitors expected at the Games.* Overall travel volume to the Games represents a very small fraction (<0.25%) of the total estimated 2015 travel volume to Zika-affected countries,() highlighting the unlikely scenario that Zika importation would be solely attributable to travel to the Games. To prevent Zika virus infection and its complications among athletes and visitors to the Games and importation of Zika virus into countries that could sustain local transmission, pregnant women should not travel to the Games, mosquito bites should be avoided while traveling and for 3 weeks after returning home, and measures should be taken to prevent sexual transmission (Box).
Asunto(s)
Brotes de Enfermedades , Salud Global , Viaje , Infección por el Virus Zika/transmisión , Aniversarios y Eventos Especiales , Atletas , Brasil/epidemiología , Humanos , Medición de Riesgo , Infección por el Virus Zika/epidemiologíaRESUMEN
OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the screening measures that would have been required to assess all travellers at risk of transporting A(H1N1)pdm09 out of Mexico by air at the start of the 2009 pandemic. METHODS: Data from flight itineraries for travellers who flew from Mexico were used to estimate the number of international airports where health screening measures would have been needed, and the number of travellers who would have had to be screened, to assess all air travellers who could have transported the H1N1 influenza virus out of Mexico during the initial stages of the 2009 A(H1N1) pandemic. FINDINGS: Exit screening at 36 airports in Mexico, or entry screening of travellers arriving on direct flights from Mexico at 82 airports in 26 other countries, would have resulted in the assessment of all air travellers at risk of transporting A(H1N1)pdm09 out of Mexico at the start of the pandemic. Entry screening of 116 travellers arriving from Mexico by direct or connecting flights would have been necessary for every one traveller at risk of transporting A(H1N1)pdm09. Screening at just eight airports would have resulted in the assessment of 90% of all air travellers at risk of transporting A(H1N1)pdm09 out of Mexico in the early stages of the pandemic. CONCLUSION: During the earliest stages of the A(H1N1) pandemic, most public health benefits potentially attainable through the screening of air travellers could have been achieved by screening travellers at only eight airports.
Asunto(s)
Aeropuertos/estadística & datos numéricos , Subtipo H1N1 del Virus de la Influenza A , Gripe Humana/diagnóstico , Tamizaje Masivo/métodos , Viaje/estadística & datos numéricos , Análisis Costo-Beneficio , Salud Global , Humanos , Gripe Humana/epidemiología , Tamizaje Masivo/economía , Tamizaje Masivo/estadística & datos numéricos , México/epidemiología , Pandemias , Estudios RetrospectivosRESUMEN
In 1997, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Mexican Secretariat of Health, and border health officials began the development of the Border Infectious Disease Surveillance (BIDS) project, a surveillance system for infectious diseases along the U.S.-Mexico border. During a 3-year period, a binational team implemented an active, sentinel surveillance system for hepatitis and febrile exanthems at 13 clinical sites. The network developed surveillance protocols, trained nine surveillance coordinators, established serologic testing at four Mexican border laboratories, and created agreements for data sharing and notification of selected diseases and outbreaks. BIDS facilitated investigations of dengue fever in Texas-Tamaulipas and measles in California-Baja California. BIDS demonstrates that a binational effort with local, state, and federal participation can create a regional surveillance system that crosses an international border. Reducing administrative, infrastructure, and political barriers to cross-border public health collaboration will enhance the effectiveness of disease prevention projects such as BIDS.
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Control de Enfermedades Transmisibles , Hepatitis Viral Humana/diagnóstico , Cooperación Internacional , Desarrollo de Programa , Vigilancia de Guardia , Exantema/diagnóstico , Exantema/epidemiología , Fiebre/diagnóstico , Fiebre/epidemiología , Hepatitis Viral Humana/epidemiología , Humanos , México/epidemiología , Estados Unidos/epidemiologíaRESUMEN
Yellow fever (YF) is a potentially lethal mosquito-borne viral hemorrhagic fever endemic in Africa and South America. Nine million tourists annually arrive in countries where YF is endemic, and fatal cases of YF have occurred recently in travelers. In this article, we review the risk factors for YF during travel and the use of YF 17D vaccine to prevent the disease. Although the vaccine is highly effective and has a long history of safe use, the occurrence of rare, fatal adverse events has raised new concerns. These events should not deter travelers to areas where YF is endemic from being immunized, because the risk of YF infection and illness may be high in rural areas and cannot be easily defined by existing surveillance. To avoid unnecessary vaccination, physicians should vaccinate persons at risk on the basis of knowledge of the epidemiology of the disease, reports of epidemic activity, season, and the likelihood of exposure to vector mosquitoes.