RESUMEN
Corrective or refutational posts from ordinary users on social media have the potential to improve the online information ecosystem. While initial evidence of these social corrections is promising, a better understanding of the effects across different topics, formats, and audiences is needed. In three pre-registered experiments (N = 1944 UK, N = 2467 Italy, N = 2210 Germany) where respondents completed a social media post assessment task with false and true news posts on various topics (e.g., health, climate change, technology), we find that social corrections reduce perceived accuracy of and engagement with false news posts. We also find that social corrections that flag true news as false decrease perceived accuracy of and engagement with true news posts. We did not find evidence to support moderation of these effects by correction strength, anti-expert sentiments, cognitive reflection capacities, or susceptibility to social influence. While social corrections can be effective for false news, they may also undermine belief in true news.
RESUMEN
Why do some international organizations (IO) accrete delegated authority over time while in others delegation is static or declines? We hypothesize that the dynamics of delegation are shaped by an IO's founding contract. IOs rooted in an open-ended contract have the capacity to discover cooperation over time: as new problems arise these IOs can adopt new policies or strengthen collaboration in existing areas. This, in turn, triggers a demand for delegation. However, this logic is mediated by the political regime of the IO. In predominantly democratic IOs, delegation is constrained by politicization which intensifies as an IO's policy portfolio broadens. These claims are tested using an updated version of the Measure of International Authority dataset covering 41 regional IOs between 1950 and 2019. Controlling for alternative explanations and addressing potential endogeneity across a range of model specifications, we find robust support for our argument. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11558-022-09482-0.