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A framework for action planning, called ideomotor theory, suggests that actions are represented by their perceivable effects. Thus, any activation of the effect image, either endogenously or exogenously, will trigger the corresponding action. We review contemporary studies relating to ideomotor theory in which researchers have investigated various manipulations of action effects and how those effects acquire discriminative control over the actions. Evidence indicates that the knowledge about the relation between response and effect is still a critical component even when other factors, such as stimulus-response or response-response relations, are controlled. When consistent tone effects are provided after responses are made, performance in serial-reaction tasks is better than when the effects are random. Methodology in which acquisition and test stages are used with choice-reaction tasks shows that an action is automatically associated with its effect bilaterally and that anticipation of the effect facilitates action. Ideomotor phenomena include stimulus-response compatibility, in which the perceptual feature of the stimulus activates its corresponding action code when the stimulus itself resembles the effect codes. For this reason, other stimulus-driven action facilitation such as ideomotor action and imitation are treated as ideomotor phenomena and are reviewed. Ideomotor theory also implies that ongoing action affects perception of concurrent events, a topic which we review briefly. Issues concerning ideomotor theory are identified and evaluated. We categorize the range of ideomotor explanations into several groups by whether intermediate steps are assumed to complete sensorimotor transformation or not and by whether a general theoretical framework or a more restricted one is provided by the account.

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Although it is distinct from induction and deduction, abduction is often mistaken for them. The initial stage of abduction, or novel hypothesis abduction, has 2 components. The first concerns providing novel hypotheses that explain the pattern of data; the second suggests that the novel hypothesis should be accepted to the extent that it is the best available hypothesis. The second component is known as inference to the best explanation. Others have shown how novel hypothesis abduction provides an important type of reasoning for generating novel hypotheses. Our concern is with evaluating already formed abductions to determine which is best, using inference to the best explanation in connection with theories. We call this competing theories abduction. Competing theories abduction suggests that theories should be evaluated in relation to other theories rather than in isolation, as suggested by some philosophers and psychologists. In psychology this is demonstrated in connection with 2 widely accepted forms of relativism: the logical possibilities view and unique standards relativism.

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In Experiment 1 each rat received two different fixed series of three trials each. The unconditioned stimulus occurred on Trial 1 of one series and on Trial 3 of the other series, all other trials being nonreinforced. Previous Pavlovian investigations have shown that rats can remember the immediately prior reward outcome and anticipate the immediately subsequent reward outcome. Experiment 1 demonstrated that rats could remember and anticipate even more remote reward outcomes. In Experiment 2 two groups received a series of two nonrewarded trials followed by a rewarded trial. It was demonstrated that a change in the conditioned stimulus (CS) from Trial 2 to Trial 3, which occurred in one group, produced weaker responding than in the other group that did not experience such CS change. On the basis of these findings it was suggested that the rats organized the trials of a series into a unit or chunk. This was concluded for two reasons. First, remembering and anticipating remote reward outcomes strongly suggests that responding is being controlled by events extending beyond the current trial. Secondly, the experimental manipulations employed in the Pavlovian situation here are similar to those used in prior human learning and animal instrumental learning investigations concerned with chunking. Thus, it would appear that chunking is a ubiquitous phenomenon appearing in human serial learning (e.g., Bower and Winzenz 1969; Crowder 1976), in animal instrumental learning (e.g., Capaldi 1992; Hulse and Dorsky 1977; Terrace 1987), and now in Pavlovian learning.

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Qualitative methods are becoming increasingly popular in psychology. Although the distinction between qualitative and quantitative often is stated in terms of methods, the real distinction is between worldviews: that favored by most qualitative methodologists, which emphasizes subjective experience and multiple realities, and that commonly accepted in science. The worldview accepted by most adherents of qualitative inquiry suggests the exclusive use of methods that include verbal reports of lived experience. Qualitative methods serve an important function in psychology, but their use as recommended by their adherents is limited in 2 respects: The adherents use a narrow and unconventional approach to qualitative methods that differs from that normally understood, and they favor use of a restricted range of qualitative methods over other qualitative methods and quantitative methods. If qualitative inquiry is to make a greater contribution to psychology, researchers in that tradition must acquire a better understanding of contemporary science, correct their misunderstandings of the rationale for quantitative methods, and address the apparent limitations of their methods emphasizing reported experience.

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The purpose of this article is to describe a relatively new movement in the history and philosophy of science, naturalism, a form of pragmatism emphasizing that methodological principles are empirical statements. Thus, methodological principles must be evaluated and justified on the same basis as other empirical statements. On this view, methodological statements may be less secure than the specific scientific theories to which they give rise. The authors examined the feasibility of a naturalistic approach to methodology using logical and historical analysis and by contrasting theories that predict new facts versus theories that explain already known facts. They provide examples of how differences over methodological issues in psychology and in science generally may be resolved using a naturalistic, or empirical, approach.

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Logical positivism, widely regarded as the received epistemology of psychology in the first half of the 20th century, was supplanted in the 1960s by various postpositivistic, relativistic philosophies of science, most notably that of Kuhn. Recently, Laudan, a major figure in the philosophy of science, developed a novel approach called normative naturalism that provides an alternative to positivism and relativism. His central thesis is that the two are not always on opposite ends of a continuum but rather have many assumptions in common. This article brings Laudan's important views to the attention of psychologists and describes some of the unique implications of these views for the conduct of research and theory in psychology. These implications, which follow from a number of closely reasoned pragmatic arguments, include more realistic and appropriate evaluation of theory and methodology than has been suggested by logical positivism or relativism.

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In memory-discrimination learning, reward-produced memories are differentially rewarded such that they are the only stimuli available to support discriminative responding. Memory-discrimination learning was used in this study as follows: Reward-produced memories that were assumed to regulate instrumental performance in previously reported extinction and discrimination learning investigations were isolated and explicitly differentially reinforced (prior to a shift to extinction) in each of 4 runway investigations with rats. Results obtained here in the explicit discrimination learning stage and in the subsequent extinction stage were consistent with the prediction of the memory view and with prior discrimination learning and extinction findings. The memory interpretation was applied to memory-discrimination learning, to extinction, and to 2 other types of discrimination learning. It appears that a theory must use reward-produced memories to explain all 4 types of discrimination learning.

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In 1929, H.C. Blodgett reported the results of a seminal maze learning experiment using rats. In that experiment, hungry rats ran in a complex maze but were not rewarded on reaching the goal box. Not surprisingly, the performance of the hungry rats did not improve over trials. However, with the introduction of reward, the error scores of the rats suddenly dropped to the level of the control rats that were rewarded from the outset. This finding indicates that the experimental group had learned the maze despite the absence of reward but that the learning was latent rather than manifest. With Blodgett's findings, the distinction between learning and performance became firmly established, if not as widely appreciated as it might be. Blodgett's (1929) early experimental finding of latent learning could well serve as a paradigm for the approach taken here. That is, we have emphasized the principle that a lack of performance does not necessarily indicate a lack of either learning or memory. This principle is much more than an empty admonition: We have shown it can have a firm theoretical basis, one that has been confirmed repeatedly by experiments cited throughout this paper. That is, it has been shown numerous times that a failure to perform either in a Pavlovian or instrumental learning task or to remember in an animal or human memory task under one set of conditions could be alleviated under another set of conditions. Forgetting was viewed here as a failure of performance resulting from the cues at test retrieving a memory other than the target memory or retrieving no memory at all. According to this view, memory involves discrimination learning. Essentially, memories are stored in the presence of an elaborate set of interoceptive and exteroceptive stimuli, a context. Whether at test the target memory is retrieved depends on how well the cues at test discriminate between the target memory and other memories. This approach suggests that forgetting does not occur: There is only a failure to perform because of a difference between the stimulus conditions prevailing at encoding and at test. It was demonstrated that this approach is at least as reasonable as that which suggests that true forgetting occurs, but certainly more useful. At least three advantages adhere to our view that memory is a discrimination problem. First, in almost numberless cases, it has been shown that failure of performance under one set of stimulus conditions can be alleviated under some other set of stimulus conditions. Second, the proposition that altered stimulus conditions are responsible for forgetting is one of wide generality. Thus, the altered stimulus conditions approach can serve as an explanation not only for various human memory findings but also for various animal memory and learning findings. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the present approach provides investigators with a powerful and proven working hypothesis. It tells us not to accept failures of performance as indicating an absence of learning or a loss of memory but rather to seek conditions favorable to improving performance, a strategy that should lead to a better fundamental understanding of memory and learning. This position is obviously a type of optimality theory, of which evolutionary theory is one of the more outstanding examples. In optimality theory, any deviation from some ideal state or condition prompts the investigator to seek the reasons for deviation. This approach may prove as successful when applied to learning and memory as it has to other areas of science.

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The development of the sequential approach to instrumental learning from about 1958 to the present is described. The sequential model began as an attempt to explain a particular class of neglected partial reward phenomena, those in which performance in acquisition and extinction is influenced by the particular sequence in which rewarded and nonrewarded trials occur in acquisition, and it was subsequently applied to a variety of other phenomena. Over time, the sequential model grew, sometimes through the replacement of older assumptions by novel ones, as when retrieved memories replaced stimulus traces, and sometimes simply through the addition of novel assumptions, such as that animals are capable of remembering retrospectively one, two, three or more prior nonrewarded outcomes-the N-length assumption. The most recent assumption added to the sequential model is that on a given trial the animal may utilize its memory of prior reward outcomes to anticipate both the current reward outcome and one or more subsequent reward outcomes. One way to view the sequential model is to say that it is a specific theory in various degrees of competition with other specific theories. Several examples of this are provided. Another way to view the sequential model, a more important way in my opinion, is to see it as a representative of a general theoretical approach, intertrial theory, which differs in fundamental respects from another much more generally utilized theoretical approach, intra-trial theory. I suggest that there is a substantial body of data that can be explained by inter-trial mechanisms but not by intratrial mechanisms. The future may well reveal that the inter-trial mechanisms have greater explanatory potential than the currently more popular intratrial mechanisms.

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According to some, psychology as it has been practiced is based on a world view known as mechanism. Individuals from a number of different areas of psychology, most recently within the behavior-analytic community, have strongly argued that psychology should be based on a different world view, contextualism. They emphasize a variety of characteristics that, in their view, differentiate a contextualistically based psychology from one based on mechanism. We examine these characteristics and find them to be of dubious value for differentiating a contextualistic approach to psychology from others. One proposal of some advocates of contextualism is that contextualistic approaches should develop independently from most of the remainder of psychology, which they regard as mechanistic. This proposal is said to be derived from the metaphilosophy of Pepper (1942). We evaluate this proposal and reject it. We go on to suggest that the mechanis-tic/contextualistic dichotomy is too constraining to realistically describe various approaches to psychology.

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There is growing agreement that to explain instrumental learning properly, one should emphasize memory as well as expectancy. I call this approachmemory-expectancy theory. Amsel's (1992) frustration theory is one variety of memory-expectancy theory. Capaldi's (1994) sequential theory is another. In this report, I examine in considerable detail the effects of percentage and sequence of reward on extinction following different levels of acquisition training. These extinction findings, taken together with certain serial learning acquisition findings, seem to support a novel version of memory-expectancy theory, one that in some respects is similar to and in some respects is different from that suggested by Amsel. First, on the basis of this analysis, we may reject two ideas: that animals remember only the prior reward event and that animals anticipate only the reward event contingent upon the current response. Second, the analysis supports three salient propositions of the present memory-expectancy approach. Memories of reward events may serve as conditioned stimuli for expectancies of reward events. On any current trial, the animal may remember each of the reward events associated with one or more prior trials. On any current trial, the animal may anticipate not only the current reward event, but also reward events contingent upon subsequent trials. Essentially, according to this model, the stimuli that elicit expectancies, as well as the expectancies themselves, may change progressively over a series of learning trials.

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Retrieval of the memory of non-reward on a rewarded trial was investigated here employing rats in a T-maze. A forced choice procedure was used. The daily rewarded (R) and non-rewarded (N) trials always occurred in a fixed order, two R, four N, and finally two R, i.e. the series was R1-R2-N1-N2-N3-N4-R3-R4. In an original acquisition phase. Trial N4 of the series having occurred in a particular spatial alternative, e.g. left, it was followed by R3 either in the same alternative, Groups C and T, or in the opposite alternative, Group R. Group T, unlike Groups C and R, received a relatively long intertrial interval between N4 and R3. In a shift phase, groups were treated as in original acquisition except that the long intertrial interval (Group T) and the change in response (Group R) now occurred between R3 and R4 rather than N4 and R3. The major finding in original acquisition was slower running by Groups T and R than by Group C on Trials N2, N3, and N4. In shift, differences between the groups disappeared. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that response-produced cues contribute to memory retrieval.

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In each of four experiments, rats were provided with the same three-event decreasing series (18-1-0) of 0.045-g food pellets in a runway. Tracking, running fast to 18 pellets and running slow to 1 and 0 pellets, was investigated as a function of the temporal interval elapsing between the events of the series (the retention interval), shifts in retention interval, and number of trials each day (or the intertrial interval), a trial being defined as presentation of each of the three events of the series. Neither retention interval, which varied from 15 s to 30 min in various investigations, nor shifts in retention interval affected tracking when only one trial was given each day. But when more than one daily trial was given, tracking was acquired more slowly and was disrupted by a shift in retention interval from 15 s to 5 min. Tracking was also disrupted by a shift from one to two trials each day. These results indicate that when given one 18-1-0 trial each day, the rat partitions events on a first-event/subsequent-event basis; that little forgetting occurs even at long retention intervals; that somewhat different memories signal events when one or more than one 18-1-0 trial occurs each day; and that retention interval deficits can arise owing to the same or similar memories' signaling different events. The results described limit the generality of three hypotheses suggested in two recent investigations: that as retention interval increases, rats find it increasingly difficult to remember and utilize serial position cues; that tracking in serial tasks is not influenced by number of trials each day; and that there are specific stimuli associated with each retention interval which, when changed, necessarily disrupt performance.

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