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Cigarette excise taxes are an important tool in the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control strategy for reducing global tobacco consumption. However, contemporary tobacco control efforts also coincide with the proliferation of neoliberal economic programs calling for the withdrawal of state activity from the economy to facilitate trade. In this environment, cigarette excise taxes may be seen less as an instrument of tobacco control than a feature of an economic program that is punitive to lower-income people. This article reviews collaboration between progressive organizations in the United States and the tobacco industry in the 1980s and 1990s, documenting potential sources of unanticipated resistance to excise taxes and highlighting the tobacco industry's capacity to engage in policy issues through third-party surrogates. It is important for those implementing cigarette excise tax increases to distance tobacco control objectives from larger economic policy measures and for tobacco control advocates to build alliances with organizations working for economic fairness in order to address mutual concerns.

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OBJECTIVES: We studied tobacco industry efforts during the 1980s and 1990s to promote the National Energy Management Institute (NEMI), a nonprofit organization, as an authority on indoor air quality as part of the industry's strategy to oppose smoke-free worksite policies. METHODS: We analyzed tobacco industry documents, conducted literature searches in Lexis-Nexis for background and historical literature, and reviewed relevant public health and policy literature. RESULTS: The tobacco industry provided more than US $6 million to NEMI to establish it as an authority on indoor air quality and to work with it to undermine support for smoke-free air policies by promoting ventilation as a solution to indoor air quality problems. Tobacco industry support for NEMI was not publicly disclosed. CONCLUSIONS: NEMI was a valuable ally for the tobacco industry through NEMI's ties to organized labor, its technical background, and its status as a third-party actor. NEMI also helped the industry to portray ventilation to improve overall indoor air quality and smoke-free worksites as an either-or choice; in fact, both can improve worker health.

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Between 1987 and 1997, the tobacco industry used the issue of cigarette excise tax increases to create a political partnership with the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW), a group representing female trade unionists in the U.S. This paper documents how the industry created this relationship and the lessons tobacco-control advocates can learn from the industry's example, in order to mitigate possible unintended consequences of advocating excise tax increases. In 1998, under the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement, the tobacco industry began making documents produced in litigation available publicly. Currently, approximately 50 million pages are available online, including substantial documentation of the industry-CLUW relationship. For this study, a comprehensive search of these documents was conducted. The tobacco industry encouraged CLUW's opposition to excise tax increases by emphasizing the economic regressivity of these taxes, discussing excise taxes generically to deflect attention from cigarettes, and encouraging opposition to earmarking cigarette taxes to pay for specific programs. In addition, CLUW received at least $221,500 in financial support between 1987 and 1997 and in-kind support for its conferences, membership materials, and other services. Excise tax increases, if pursued without considering the impacts they may have on low-SES populations, may have unintended consequences. In this case, such proposals may have helped to create a relationship between CLUW and the tobacco industry. Because excise taxes are endorsed in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, tobacco-control advocates must understand how to build relationships with low-SES populations and mitigate potential alliances with the tobacco industry.

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The tobacco industry often utilizes third parties to advance its policy agenda. One such utilization occurred when the industry identified organized labor and progressive groups as potential allies whose advocacy could undermine public support for excise tax increases. To attract such collaboration, the industry framed the issue as one of tax fairness, creating a labor management committee to provide distance from tobacco companies and furthering progressive allies' interests through financial and logistical support. Internal industry documents indicate that this strategic use of ideas, institutions, and interests facilitated the recruitment of leading progressive organizations as allies. By placing excise taxes within a strategic policy nexus that promotes mutual public interest goals, public health advocates may use a similar strategy in forging their own excise tax coalitions.

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