RESUMEN

Over the last decades, the Campania Region in Italy has faced an environmental crisis due to the widespread illegal dumping and burning of waste. This has led to the area being notoriously known as the Land of Fires (Terra dei Fuochi - TdF), sparking serious concerns about public health and threatening the region's agricultural sector, one of its economic mainstays. In such a context, a timely, accurate, and reliable flow of information, aimed both at the population and at stakeholders, is crucial for establishing a proper dialogue between institutions and people, driving the empowerment of citizens. To address this crisis, the Italian Government introduced Law 6 of 2014, establishing a multidisciplinary Working Group tasked with identifying and mapping the sites affected by spills and illegal disposal in the territory. The TdF-WG defined a scientific methodology for classifying these sites in terms of prohibition on the cultivation of specific crops, consequently allowing the adoption of appropriate clean up and restoration measures for the impacted sites. This paper describes the data collection process and the IT platform commissioned by the Government to the IZS-TE and used by the TdF-WG to exchange data, knowledge, and technology, thereby fostering efficient and effective crisis management.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

After viewing an image representing an action on an object, we recognize the forward states of the seen action faster than the backward states. The present study exploits a variant of a new experimental paradigm to investigate cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect. Participants viewed a series of still photos of unfolding actions on objects, each followed by a photo depicting either one of three (instead of two of the original paradigm) different and temporally distant moments after the image or one moment before the image, along with photos of different actions. Experiment 1 revealed the classical forward effects in this new context: when the task was to judge whether the action in the second photo was the same as in the first photo, evaluations were faster for all forward photos than for backward photos. In Experiment 2, we examined the role of participants' attention to the object alongside the role of attention to action kinematics in triggering these "forward effects" by manipulating participants' attentional focus. As the results showed, evaluations were faster for all forward photos when the focus was on the action kinematics, but when the focus was on the object, evaluations were faster only for the last forward photo showing the final action state. These results seem to suggest that focusing on the object triggers a representation of the action goal and thus modulates the mental simulation underlying action anticipation.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

The embodied approach states that memory traces are retrieved, at least in part, through a sensorimotor simulation of the original events, i.e., during retrieval we use our body and its sensorimotor pathways to simulate what happened during encoding. Thus, body manipulations that are incongruent with the motor elements involved at encoding should modulate memory performance. To test this hypothesis, we devised two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants had to observe (observation task) or observe and also perform an action on (enactment task) a series of objects. At recognition, they recognised the enacted objects faster and more accurately than the observed ones. Crucially, in Experiment 2, we manipulated body posture during recognition: one group was asked to hold their hands/arms in front of them (non-interfering group), and the other group was asked to block their hands/arms behind their back (interfering group). The results on reaction times, but not those on accuracy, showed a critical interaction: while the noninterfering group recognised enacted objects faster than observed objects, this advantage disappeared for the interfering group. This suggests that adopting a posture inconsistent with action at encoding could influence the time needed to correctly recognise the objects, but not the accuracy of the recognition.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

The main assumption underlying the present investigation is that action observation elicits a mandatory mental simulation representing the action forward in time. In Experiment 1, participants observed pairs of photos portraying the initial and the final still frames of an action video; then they observed a photo depicting the very same action but either forward or backward in time. Their task was to tell whether the action in the photo portrayed something happened before or after the action seen at encoding. In this explicit task, the evaluation was faster for forward photos than for backward photos. Crucially, the effect was replicated when instructions asked only to evaluate at test whether the photo depicted a scene congruent with the action seen at encoding (implicit task from two still frames, Experiment 2), and when at encoding, they were presented a single still frame and evaluated at test whether a photo depicted a scene congruent with the action seen at encoding (implicit task from single still frame; Experiment 3). Overall, the results speak in favour of a mandatory mechanism through which our brain simulates the action also in tasks that do not explicitly require action simulation.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Based on the assumption that spatial reasoning relies on the construction of mental models of the states of affairs described in the premises, and on evidence that sensory-motor imagery can enhance cognitive abilities, we hypothesised that imagining moving the objects mentioned in the premises to the specific spatial locations should favour spatial reasoning. The results of Experiment 1 confirmed the prediction: when participants imagined moving the objects mentioned in the premises (dynamic-engagement condition), they drew accurate inferences faster compared with participants who merely read the premises (static-non-engagement condition). Experiment 2 was in part a replication of Experiment 1 but included two additional experimental conditions to control for possible effects of self-engagement in reasoning: in one condition, participants imagined that someone else was moving the objects (dynamic-non-engagement condition), and in the other condition, participants imagined that they were observing the objects (static-engagement condition). The results revealed an interaction between motor imagery and engagement in decreasing response times to spatial problems. We discuss the practical implications of the current results.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

This article presents a theory of recursion in thinking and language. In the logic of computability, a function maps one or more sets to another, and it can have a recursive definition that is semi-circular, i.e., referring in part to the function itself. Any function that is computable - and many are not - can be computed in an infinite number of distinct programs. Some of these programs are semi-circular too, but they needn't be, because repeated loops of instructions can compute any recursive function. Our theory aims to explain how naive individuals devise informal programs in natural language, and is itself implemented in a computer program that creates programs. Participants in our experiments spontaneously simulate loops of instructions in kinematic mental models. They rely on such loops to compute recursive functions for rearranging the order of cars in trains on a track with a siding. Kolmogorov complexity predicts the relative difficulty of abducing such programs - for easy rearrangements, such as reversing the order of the cars, to difficult ones, such as splitting a train in two and interleaving the two resulting halves (equivalent to a faro shuffle). This rearrangement uses both the siding and part of the track as working memories, shuffling cars between them, and so it relies on the power of a linear-bounded computer. Linguistic evidence implies that this power is more than necessary to compose the meanings of sentences in natural language from those of their grammatical constituents.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Action observation triggers by default a mental simulation of action unfolding in time. We assumed that this simulation is "embodied": the body is the medium through which observer's sensorimotor modalities simulate the observed action. The participants in two experiments observed videos, each depicting the central part of an action performed by an actress on an object (e.g., answering the phone) and soon after each video they observed a photo portraying a state of the action not observed in the video, either depicting the initial part or the final part of the whole action. Their task was to evaluate whether the photo portrayed something before (backward photo) or after the action in the video (forward photo). Results showed that evaluation of forward photos was faster than evaluation of backward photos (Experiment 1). Crucially, participants' body posture modulated this effect: keeping the hands crossed behind the back interfered with forward simulations (Experiment 2). These results speak about the role of the observer's body posture in processing other people's actions.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Deontic assertions concern what people should and shouldn't do. One sort concern moral principles, such as: People should care for the environment; and another sort concern social conventions, such as: People should knock before entering an office. The present research examined such deontic assertions and their corresponding factual assertions, such as: People care for the environment and People knock before entering an office. Experiment 1 showed a correlation between emotions and beliefs for both sorts of deontic assertion, but not for their factual counterparts in which the word "should" had been deleted (as in the preceding examples). Experiment 2 showed that changing the pleasantness of participants' emotions about social conventions changed their strength of belief in them. Experiment 3 showed conversely that changing the participants' strength of belief in social conventions changed the pleasantness of their emotions about them. These results corroborate the mental model theory of deontic assertions, which postulates that emotions and beliefs about deontics depend on parallel systems that interact with one another.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

A dual-process theory postulates that belief and emotions about moral assertions can affect one another. The present study corroborated this prediction. Experiments 1, 2 and 3 showed that the pleasantness of a moral assertion - from loathing it to loving it - correlated with how strongly individuals believed it, i.e., its subjective probability. But, despite repeated testing, this relation did not occur for factual assertions. To create the correlation, it sufficed to change factual assertions, such as, "Advanced countries are democracies," into moral assertions, "Advanced countries should be democracies". Two further experiments corroborated the two-way causal relations for moral assertions. Experiment 4 showed that recall of pleasant memories about moral assertions increased their believability, and that the recall of unpleasant memories had the opposite effect. Experiment 5 showed that the creation of reasons to believe moral assertions increased the pleasantness of the emotions they evoked, and that the creation of reasons to disbelieve moral assertions had the opposite effect. Hence, emotions can change beliefs about moral assertions; and reasons can change emotions about moral assertions. We discuss the implications of these results for alternative theories of morality.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Several theoretical approaches suggest that language comprehension and action observation rely on similar mental simulations. Granted that these two simulations partially overlap, we assumed that simulations stemming from action observations are more direct than those stemming from action phrases. The implied prediction was that simulation from action observation should prevail on simulation from action phrases when their effects are contrasted. The results of three experiments confirmed that, when at encoding the phrases were paired with pictures of actions whose kinematics was incongruent with the implied kinematics of the actions described in the phrases, memory for action phrases was impaired (Experiment 1). However, the reverse was not true: when the pictures were paired with phrases representing actions whose kinematics were incongruent with the kinematics of the actions portrayed in the pictures, memory for pictures portraying actions was not impaired (Experiment 2). Also, in line with evidence that simulations from action phrases and those from action observation partially overlap, when their effects were not contrasted their products were misrecognized. In our experiments, when action phrases only presented at recognition described actions depicted in pictures seen at encoding, they were misrecognized as had already been read at encoding (Experiment 1); further, when pictures only presented at recognition portrayed actions described in phrases presented at encoding, they were misrecognized as seen at encoding (Experiment 2). A third experiment excluded the possibility that the pattern of findings was simply a consequence of better memory for pictures of actions as opposed to memory for action phrases (Experiment 3). The implications of our results in relation to the literature on simulation in language comprehension and action observation are discussed.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Memory for action phrases improves in the listeners when the speaker accompanies them with gestures compared to when the speaker stays still. Since behavioral studies revealed a pivotal role of the listeners' motor system, we aimed to disentangle the role of primary motor and premotor cortices. Participants had to recall phrases uttered by a speaker in two conditions: in the gesture condition, the speaker performed gestures congruent with the action; in the no-gesture condition, the speaker stayed still. In Experiment 1, half of the participants underwent inhibitory rTMS over the hand/arm region of the left premotor cortex (PMC) and the other half over the hand/arm region of the left primary motor cortex (M1). The enactment effect disappeared only following rTMS over PMC. In Experiment 2, we detected the usual enactment effect after rTMS over vertex, thereby excluding possible nonspecific rTMS effects. These findings suggest that the information encoded in the premotor cortex is a crucial part of the memory trace.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Memory for series of action phrases improves in listeners when speakers accompany each phrase with congruent gestures compared to when speakers stay still. Studies reveal that the listeners' motor system, at encoding, plays a crucial role in this enactment effect. We present two experiments on gesture observation, which explored the role of the listeners' motor system at recall. The participants listened to the phrases uttered by a speaker in two conditions in each experiment. In the gesture condition, the speaker uttered the phrases with accompanying congruent gestures, and in the no-gesture condition, the speaker stayed still while uttering the phrases. The participants were then invited, in both conditions of the experiments, to perform a motor task while recalling the phrases proffered by the speaker. The results revealed that the advantage of observing gestures on memory disappears if the listeners move at recall arms and hands (same motor effectors moved by the speaker, Experiment 1a), but not when the listeners move legs and feet (different motor effectors from those moved by the speaker, Experiment 1b). The results suggest that the listeners' motor system is involved not only during the encoding of action phrases uttered by a speaker but also when recalling these phrases during retrieval.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

The deep comprehension of a text is tantamount to the construction of an articulated mental model of that text. The number of correct recollections is an index of a learner's mental model of a text. We assume that another index of comprehension is the timing of the gestures produced during text recall; gestures are simultaneous with speech when the learner has built an articulated mental model of the text, whereas they anticipate the speech when the learner has built a less articulated mental model. The results of four experiments confirm the predictions deriving from our assumptions for both children and adults. Provided that the recollections are correct, the timing of gestures can differ and can be considered a further measure of the quality of the mental model, beyond the number of correct recollections.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Influential theories on moral judgments propose that they rely either on emotions or on innate moral principles. In contrast, the mental model theory postulates that moral judgments rely on reasoning, either intuition or deliberation. The theory allows for the possibility that intuitions lead to utilitarian judgments. This paper reports two experiments involving fifth-grade children, adolescents, and adults; the results revealed that children reason intuitively to resolve moral dilemmas in which action and inaction lead to different outcomes. In particular, the results showed female children to be more utilitarian than female adults in resolving classical moral dilemmas: they preferred an action that achieved a good outcome for a greater number of people. Within the mental model theory's framework there is no reason to expect that females and males differ in their ability to reason, but at the moment the results for females cannot be generalized to males who were not properly represented in the adults groups of the two experiments. The result revealing that (female) children are more utilitarian than (female) adults, which is hard to explain via many current theories, was predicted by the mental model theory.

RESUMEN

Classical studies on enactment have highlighted the beneficial effects of gestures performed in the encoding phase on memory for words and sentences, for both adults and children. In the present investigation, we focused on the role of enactment for learning from scientific texts among primary-school children. We assumed that enactment would favor the construction of a mental model of the text, and we verified the derived predictions that gestures at the time of encoding would result in greater numbers of correct recollections and discourse-based inferences at recall, as compared to no gestures (Exp. 1), and in a bias to confound paraphrases of the original text with the verbatim text in a recognition test (Exp. 2). The predictions were confirmed; hence, we argue in favor of a theoretical framework that accounts for the beneficial effects of enactment on memory for texts.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

We present a theory, and its computer implementation, of how mental simulations underlie the abductions of informal algorithms and deductions from these algorithms. Three experiments tested the theory's predictions, using an environment of a single railway track and a siding. This environment is akin to a universal Turing machine, but it is simple enough for nonprogrammers to use. Participants solved problems that required use of the siding to rearrange the order of cars in a train (experiment 1). Participants abduced and described in their own words algorithms that solved such problems for trains of any length, and, as the use of simulation predicts, they favored "while-loops" over "for-loops" in their descriptions (experiment 2). Given descriptions of loops of procedures, participants deduced the consequences for given trains of six cars, doing so without access to the railway environment (experiment 3). As the theory predicts, difficulty in rearranging trains depends on the numbers of moves and cars to be moved, whereas in formulating an algorithm and deducing its consequences, it depends on the Kolmogorov complexity of the algorithm. Overall, the results corroborated the use of a kinematic mental model in creating and testing informal algorithms and showed that individuals differ reliably in the ability to carry out these tasks.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Henrich et al. address how culture leads to cognitive variability and recommend that researchers be critical about the samples they investigate. However, there are other sources of variability, such as individual strategies in reasoning and the content and context on which processes operate. Because strategy and content drive variability, those factors are of primary interest, while culture is merely incidental.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

This study concerned the role of gestures that accompany discourse in deep learning processes. We assumed that co-speech gestures favor the construction of a complete mental representation of the discourse content, and we tested the predictions that a discourse accompanied by gestures, as compared with a discourse not accompanied by gestures, should result in better recollection of conceptual information, a greater number of discourse-based inferences drawn from the information explicitly stated in the discourse, and poorer recognition of verbatim of the discourse. The results of three experiments confirmed these predictions.

RESUMEN

The aim of the present study is to compare the pragmatic ability of right- and left-hemisphere-damaged patients excluding the possible interference of linguistic deficits. To this aim, we study extralinguistic communication, that is communication performed only through gestures. The Cognitive Pragmatics Theory provides the theoretical framework: it predicts a gradient of difficulty in the comprehension of different pragmatic phenomena, that should be valid independently of the use of language or gestures as communicative means. An experiment involving 10 healthy individuals, 10 right- and 9 left-hemisphere-damaged patients, shows that pragmatic performance is better preserved in left-hemisphere-damaged (LHD) patients than in right-hemisphere-damaged (RHD) patients.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Deontic assertions concern what one ought to do, may do, and ought not to do. This paper proposes a theory of their meanings and of how these meanings are represented in mental models. The meanings of deontic assertions refer to sets of permissible and impermissible states. An experiment corroborated the ability of individuals to list these states. The most salient were those corresponding to the mental models of the assertions. When individuals reason, they rely on mental models, which do not make all states explicit. The theory predicts the most frequent conclusions drawn from deontic premises. It also predicts the occurrence of illusory inferences from assertions of permission, i.e., inferences that seem highly plausible but that are in fact invalid. Assertions of prohibitions, according to the theory, should reduce the illusions. Further experiments corroborated these predictions.

Asunto(s)