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Inequality is often one-sidedly framed as disadvantage, a practice identified as problematic by empirical research and critical scholarship, as it renders privilege invisible and shapes perceptions of and reactions to inequality. Importantly, inequality can mean differences in positive (e.g., promotions) or negative outcomes (e.g., harassment). Drawing on cognitive processes involved in (group) comparisons and the processing of positive and negative content, we predict that the valence of outcomes moderates the preference for disadvantage (vs. advantage) frames. We coded social media posts on gender inequality (Study 1, n = 1,402) and had participants in an online experiment (Study 2, n = 164) describe gender and sexual orientation inequality in positive and negative outcomes. Confirming hypotheses, people overall used disadvantage frames more, but were more likely to use advantage frames for inequality in positive (compared with negative) outcomes. We discuss theoretical implications for inequality framing research and practical implications for privilege awareness interventions.

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Economic inequality is increasing both globally and in various countries around the world, and such inequality has been linked to worsening health, well-being, and social cohesion. A key predictor for whether people take action against inequality is the extent to which they perceive it as illegitimate. We investigate how two variables jointly predict the legitimization of inequality, namely the perceived magnitude of differences in economic outcomes and the way these differences are described. Two experiments (total N = 190) tested whether framing the same difference in outcomes as an advantaged group having more or as a disadvantaged group having less moderates whether higher inequality is perceived as less legitimate. Participants perceived bigger differences as less legitimate when these differences were framed as the disadvantaged group having less. When they were framed as the advantaged group having more, the perceived magnitude of differences and legitimacy beliefs were unrelated. Together, this research highlights the importance of language for how people perceive and respond to inequality.

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Events are temporal "figures", which can be defined as identifiable segments in time, bounded by beginnings and endings. But the functions and importance of these two boundaries differ. We argue that beginnings loom larger than endings by attracting more attention, being judged as more important and interesting, warranting more explanation, and having more causal power. This difference follows from a lay notion that additions (the introduction of something new) imply more change and demand more effort than do subtractions (returning to a previous state of affairs). This "beginning advantage" is demonstrated in eight studies of people's representations of epochs and events on a historical timeline as well as in cyclical change in the annual seasons. People think it is more important to know when wars and reigns started than when they ended, and are more interested in reading about beginnings than endings of historical movements. Transitional events (such as elections and passages from one season to the next) claim more interest and grow in importance when framed as beginnings of what follows than as conclusions of what came before. As beginnings are often identified in retrospect, the beginning advantage may distort and exaggerate their actual historical importance.

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Differences between groups, individuals, or objects can be framed in multiple ways. One can, for instance, say that men generally earn more than women or that women generally earn less than men. Showing that these logically equivalent expressions are not psychologically equivalent, we demonstrate a robust more-less asymmetry in the use of and responses to comparative statements. More specifically, we show that people use "more than" statements more often than "less than" statements (Study 1); like "more than" statements better (Studies 2 and 3), agree more with opinions expressed through "more than" statements (Studies 4 and 5), and are more likely to consider factual "more than" statements to be true (Study 6). Supporting a cognitive fluency explanation, a manipulation that makes people expect disfluency while processing "less than" statements reduces this otherwise robust more-less asymmetry (Study 7). By combining comparative framing effects with cognitive fluency, the present research brings together 2 research fields in social cognition, shedding new light on both.

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The description and explanation of intergroup differences tend to be framed in terms of how nonnormative (untypical and/or stigmatized) groups differ from normative groups rather than vice versa. Three experiments examined how this affects group members' collective self-esteem. Single participants felt worse about being single when they read (Study 1) or wrote (Study 2) about how singles differ from coupled people than when they read or wrote about how coupled people differ from singles-although they mentioned more positive aspects of being single under the former comparative framing. In Study 3, left-handed participants indicated lower private collective self-esteem after writing about how left-handers differ from right-handers than after writing about how right-handers differ from left-handers. Thus, regardless of the specific characteristics that the comparison focused on, being marked as different and having to explain one's group identity negatively affected members of nonnormative, but not members of normative groups.

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In intergroup comparisons one group usually becomes the implicit norm that other groups are compared to. Three studies address the consequences that the direction of the comparison has for perceptions of the compared groups. For real groups (Experiment 1) and fictitious groups (Experiments 2 and 3) participants perceived a group as more powerful and higher in status when it had been the norm rather than the effect to be explained in a text comparing two groups. Moreover, norm groups and their "typical" members were perceived as more agentic and less communal than comparison groups, and these attributions were mediated by the ascription of power. The authors conclude that systematic ways of explaining one group rather than another could serve as a subtle tool to perpetuate the status quo of intergroup power relations.

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The glass cliff refers to women being more likely to rise to positions of organizational leadership in times of crisis than in times of success, and men being more likely to achieve those positions in prosperous times. We examine the role that (a) a gendered history of leadership and (b) stereotypes about gender and leadership play in creating the glass cliff. In Expt 1, participants who read about a company with a male history of leadership selected a male future leader for a successful organization, but chose a female future leader in times of crisis. This interaction--between company performance and gender of the preferred future leader--was eliminated for a counter-stereotypic history of female leadership. In Expt 2, stereotypically male attributes were most predictive of leader selection in a successful organization, while stereotypically female attributes were most predictive in times of crisis. Differences in the endorsement of these stereotypes, in particular with regard to the ascription of lower stereotypically female attributes to the male candidate mediated the glass cliff effect. Overall, results suggest that stereotypes about male leadership may be more important for the glass cliff effect than stereotypes about women and leadership.

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