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BackgroundMore than half the global population has been exposed to SARS-CoV-2. Naturally induced immunity influences the outcome of subsequent exposure to variants and vaccine responses. We measured anti-spike IgG responses to explore the basis for this enhanced immunity. MethodsA prospective cohort study in a South African community through the ancestral/beta/delta/omicron SARS-CoV-2 waves. Health seeking behaviour/illness were recorded and post-wave serum samples probed for IgG to Spike (CoV2-S-IgG). To estimate protective CoV2-S-IgG threshold levels, logistic functions were fit to describe the correlation of CoV2-S-IgG measured before a wave and the probability for seroconversion/boosting thereafter for unvaccinated and vaccinated adults. FindingsDespite little disease, 176/339 (51{middle dot}9%) participants were seropositive following wave 1, rising to 74%, 89{middle dot}8% and 97{middle dot}3% after waves 2, 3 and 4 respectively. CoV2-S-IgG induced by natural exposure protected against subsequent SARS-CoV-2 infection with the greatest protection for beta and the least for omicron. Vaccination induced higher CoV2-S-IgG in seropositive compared to naive vaccinees. Amongst seropositive participants, proportions above the 50% protection against infection threshold were 69% (95% CrI: 62, 72) following 1 vaccine dose, 63% (95% CrI: 63, 75) following 2 doses and only 11% (95% CrI: 7, 14) in unvaccinated during the omicron wave. InterpretationNaturally induced CoV2-S-IgG do not achieve high enough levels to prevent omicron infection in most exposed individuals but are substantially boosted by vaccination leading to significant protection. A single vaccination in those with prior immunity is more immunogenic than 2 doses in a naive vaccinee and thus may provide adequate protection. FundingUK NIH GECO award (GEC111), Wellcome Trust Centre for Infectious Disease Research in Africa (CIDRI), Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, USA (OPP1017641, OPP1017579) and NIH H3 Africa (U54HG009824, U01AI110466]. HZ is supported by the SA-MRC. MPN is supported by an Australian National Health and Medical Research Council Investigator Grant (APP1174455). BJQ is supported by a grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (OPP1139859). Stefan Flasche is supported by a Sir Henry Dale Fellowship jointly funded by the Wellcome Trust and the Royal Society (Grant number 208812/Z/17/Z). Research in context Evidence before this studyNatural infection with ancestral SARS-CoV-2 virus provides partial protection against re-infection with the same and closely related SARS-CoV-2 variants, but higher rates of re-infection have been described with Omicron. In addition, vaccination against SARS-CoV2 provides relatively lower protection against symptomatic Omicron infection than for other variants. Hybrid immunity, a combination of immunity induced by natural infection and vaccination is of critical interest due to the high incidence of natural infection in many populations and increased availability of vaccination. Vaccination following infection may provide more robust immunity than either infection or vaccination alone, but there are limited data on the impact of hybrid immunity for protection against different variants or on the optimal vaccination strategy following natural infection. Added value of this studyWe leveraged a unique South African birth cohort in a poor peri-urban area, to longitudinally investigate infection, illness and serological responses to natural exposure to SARS-CoV-2 over 4 waves of the pandemic in healthy mothers. We also investigated the impact of prior natural exposure on BNT162b2 mRNA vaccine responses. We used this information to derive estimates of levels of spike-specific IgG associated with protection for subsequent infection following natural or hybrid immunity. Despite little disease, most participants were seropositive with rates rising from 52% to 74%, 90% and 97% after waves 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Antibodies to spike protein induced by natural exposure protected against subsequent infection with the greatest protection for beta and the least for omicron. Antibody levels following vaccination were significantly higher in those who were seropositive prior to vaccine, compared to those seronegative. Amongst seropositive participants, proportions above the 50% protection against infection threshold were 69% following 1 vaccine dose, 63% following 2 doses and only 11% in unvaccinated during the omicron wave. In those seropositive prior to vaccination no significant increase in antibody levels occurred after the 2nd dose of vaccine, unlike the increase in seronegative participants. A single dose of vaccine in seropositive individuals induced higher antibody concentrations than two doses in seronegative recipients. Implications of all the available evidenceNaturally induced spike antibodies do not achieve high enough levels to prevent omicron infection in most exposed individuals but are substantially boosted by vaccination leading to significant protection. A single vaccination in those with prior natural immunity is more immunogenic than 2 doses in seronegative people and may provide adequate protection against omicron and other variants. Vaccination programs in populations with high seroprevalence using a single vaccination as a primary strategy should be considered.
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The efforts to contain SARS-CoV-2 and reduce the impact of COVID-19 have been supported by Test, Trace and Isolate (TTI) systems in many settings, including the United Kingdom. The mathematical models underlying policy decisions about TTI make assumptions about behaviour in the context of a rapidly unfolding and changeable emergency. This study investigates the reported behaviours of UK citizens in July 2021, assesses them against how a set of TTI processes are conceptualised and represented in models and then interprets the findings with modellers who have been contributing evidence to TTI policy. We report on testing practices, including the uses of and trust in different types of testing, and the challenges of testing and isolating faced by different demographic groups. The study demonstrates the potential of input from members of the public to benefit the modelling process, from guiding the choice of research questions, influencing choice of model structure, informing parameter ranges and validating or challenging assumptions, to highlighting where model assumptions are reasonable or where their poor reflection of practice might lead to uninformative results. We conclude that deeper engagement with members of the public should be integrated at regular stages of public health intervention modelling.
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O_LIThe rapid spread and high transmissibility of the Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2 is likely to lead to a significant number of key workers testing positive simultaneously. C_LIO_LIUnder a policy of self-isolation after testing positive, this may lead to extreme staffing shortfalls at the same time as e.g. hospital admissions are peaking. C_LIO_LIUsing a model of individual infectiousness and testing with lateral flow tests (LFT), we evaluate test-to-release policies against conventional fixed-duration isolation policies in terms of excess days of infectiousness, days saved, and tests used. C_LIO_LIWe find that the number of infectious days in the community can be reduced to almost zero by requiring at least 2 consecutive days of negative tests, regardless of the number of days wait until testing again after initially testing positive. C_LIO_LIOn average, a policy of fewer days wait until initiating testing (e.g 3 or 5 days) results in more days saved vs. a 10-day isolation period, but also requires a greater number of tests. C_LIO_LIDue to a lack of specific data on viral load progression, infectivity, and likelihood of testing positive by LFT over the course of an Omicron infection, we assume the same parameters as for pre-Omicron variants and explore the impact of a possible shorter proliferation phase. C_LI
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1Forecasts based on epidemiological modelling have played an important role in shaping public policy throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. This modelling combines knowledge about infectious disease dynamics with the subjective opinion of the researcher who develops and refines the model and often also adjusts model outputs. Developing a forecast model is difficult, resource- and time-consuming. It is therefore worth asking what modelling is able to add beyond the subjective opinion of the researcher alone. To investigate this, we analysed different real-time forecasts of cases of and deaths from COVID-19 in Germany and Poland over a 1-4 week horizon submitted to the German and Polish Forecast Hub. We compared crowd forecasts elicited from researchers and volunteers, against a) forecasts from two semi-mechanistic models based on common epidemiological assumptions and b) the ensemble of all other models submitted to the Forecast Hub. We found crowd forecasts, despite being overconfident, to outperform all other methods across all forecast horizons when forecasting cases (weighted interval score relative to the Hub ensemble 2 weeks ahead: 0.89). Forecasts based on computational models performed comparably better when predicting deaths (rel. WIS 1.26), suggesting that epidemiological modelling and human judgement can complement each other in important ways.
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BackgroundMany countries require incoming air travellers to quarantine on arrival and/or undergo testing to limit importation of SARS-CoV-2. MethodsWe developed mathematical models of SARS-CoV-2 viral load trajectories over the course of infection to assess the effectiveness of quarantine and testing strategies. We consider the utility of pre and post-flight Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and lateral flow testing (LFT) to reduce transmission risk from infected arrivals and to reduce the duration of, or replace, quarantine. We also estimate the effect of each strategy relative to domestic incidence, and limits of achievable risk reduction, for 99 countries where flight data and case numbers are estimated. ResultsWe find that LFTs immediately pre-flight are more effective than PCR tests 3 days before departure in decreasing the number of departing infectious travellers. Pre-flight LFTs and post-flight quarantines, with tests to release, may prevent the majority of transmission from infectious arrivals while reducing the required duration of quarantine; a pre-flight LFT followed by 5 days in quarantine with a test to release would reduce the expected number of secondary cases generated by an infected traveller compared to symptomatic self-isolation alone, Rs, by 85% (95% UI: 74%, 96%) for PCR and 85% (95% UI: 70%, 96%) for LFT, even assuming imperfect adherence to quarantine (28% of individuals) and self-isolation following a positive test (86%). Under the same adherence assumptions, 5 days of daily LFT testing would reduce Rs by 91% (95% UI: 75%, 98%). ConclusionsStrategies aimed at reducing the risk of imported cases should be considered with respect to: domestic incidence, transmission, and susceptibility; measures in place to support quarantining travellers; and incidence of new variants of concern in travellers origin countries. Daily testing with LFTs for 5 days is comparable to 5 days of quarantine with a test on exit or 14 days with no test.
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Previous work has indicated that contact tracing and isolation of index case and quarantine of potential secondary cases can, in concert with physical distancing measures, be an effective strategy for reducing transmission of SARS-CoV-2 (1). Currently, contacts traced manually through the NHS Test and Trace scheme in the UK are asked to self-isolate for 14 days from the day they were exposed to the index case, which represents the upper bound for the incubation period (2). However, following previous work on screening strategies for air travellers (3,4) it may be possible that this quarantine period could be reduced if combined with PCR testing. Adapting the simulation model for contact tracing, we find that quarantine periods of at least 10 days combined with a PCR test on day 9 may largely emulate the results from a 14-day quarantine period in terms of the averted transmission potential from secondary cases (72% (95%UI: 3%, 100%) vs 75% (4%, 100%), respectively). These results assume the delays from testing index cases and tracing their contacts are minimised (no longer than 4.5 days on average). If secondary cases are traced and quarantined 1 day earlier on average, shorter quarantine periods of 8 days with a test on day 7 (76% (7%, 100%)) approach parity with the 14 day quarantine period with a 1 day longer delay to the index cases test. However, the risk of false-negative PCR tests early in a traced cases infectious period likely prevents the use of testing to reduce quarantine periods further than this, and testing immediately upon tracing, with release if negative, will avert just 17% of transmission potential on average. In conclusion, the use of PCR testing is an effective strategy for reducing quarantine periods for secondary cases, while still reducing transmission of SARS-CoV-2, especially if delays in the test and trace system can be reduced, and may improve quarantine compliance rates.
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To mitigate SARS-CoV-2 transmission risks from international travellers, many countries currently use a combination of up to 14 days of self-quarantine on arrival and testing for active infection. We used a simulation model of air travellers arriving to the UK from the EU or the USA and the timing of their stages of infection to evaluate the ability of these strategies to reduce the risk of seeding community transmission. We find that a quarantine period of 8 days on arrival with a PCR test on day 7 (with a 1-day delay for test results) can reduce the number of infectious arrivals released into the community by a median 94% compared to a no quarantine, no test scenario. This reduction is similar to that achieved by a 14-day quarantine period (median 99% reduction). Shorter quarantine periods still can prevent a substantial amount of transmission; all strategies in which travellers spend at least 5 days (the mean incubation period) in quarantine and have at least one negative test before release are highly effective (e.g. a test on day 5 with release on day 6 results in a median 88% reduction in transmission potential). Without intervention, the current high prevalence in the US (40 per 10,000) results in a higher expected number of infectious arrivals per week (up to 23) compared to the EU (up to 12), despite an estimated 8 times lower volume of travel in July 2020. Requiring a 14-day quarantine period likely results in less than 1 infectious traveller each entering the UK per week from the EU and the USA (97.5th percentile). We also find that on arrival the transmission risk is highest from pre-symptomatic travellers; quarantine policies will shift this risk increasingly towards asymptomatic infections if eventually-symptomatic individuals self-isolate after the onset of symptoms. As passenger numbers recover, strategies to reduce the risk of re-introduction should be evaluated in the context of domestic SARS-CoV-2 incidence, preparedness to manage new outbreaks, and the economic and psychological impacts of quarantine.
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Understanding changes in human mobility in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic is crucial for assessing the impacts of travel restrictions designed to reduce disease spread. Here, relying on data from mainland China, we investigated the spatio-temporal characteristics of human mobility between 1st January and 1st March 2020 and discussed their public health implications. An outbound travel surge from Wuhan before travel restrictions were implemented was also observed across China due to the Lunar New Year, indicating that holiday travel may have played a larger role in mobility changes compared to impending travel restrictions. Holiday travel also shifted healthcare pressure related to COVID-19 towards locations with lower access to care. Network analyses showed no sign of major changes in the transportation network after Lunar New Year. Changes observed were temporary and have not yet led to structural reorganisation of the transportation network at the time of this study. One sentence summaryUnderstanding travel before, during, and after the introduction of travel restrictions in China in response to the COVID-19 Pandemic.
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BackgroundTo contain the spread of COVID-19, a cordon sanitaire was put in place in Wuhan prior to the Lunar New Year, on 23 January 2020, restricting travel to other parts of China. We assess the efficacy of the cordon sanitaire to delay the introduction and onset of local transmission of COVID-19 in other major cities in mainland China. MethodsWe estimated the number of infected travellers from Wuhan to other major cities in mainland China from November 2019 to March 2020 using previously estimated COVID-19 prevalence in Wuhan and publicly available mobility data. We focused on Beijing, Chongqing, Hangzhou, and Shenzhen as four representative major cities to identify the potential independent contribution of the cordon sanitaire and holiday travel. To do this, we simulated outbreaks generated by infected arrivals in these destination cities using stochastic branching processes. We also modelled the effect of the cordon sanitaire in combination with reduced transmissibility scenarios representing the effect of local non-pharmaceutical interventions. FindingsIn the four cities, given the potentially high prevalence of COVID-19 in Wuhan between Dec 2019 and early Jan 2020, local transmission may have been seeded as early as 2 - 8 January 2020. By the time the cordon sanitaire was imposed, simulated case counts were likely in the hundreds. The cordon sanitaire alone did not substantially affect the epidemic progression in these cities, although it may have had some effect in smaller cities. InterpretationOur results indicate that the cordon sanitaire may not have prevented COVID-19 spread in major Chinese cities; local non-pharmaceutical interventions were likely more important for this. Research in ContextO_ST_ABSEvidence before this studyC_ST_ABSIn late 2019, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) was detected in Wuhan, China. In response to the outbreak, authorities enacted a cordon sanitaire in order to limit spread. Several studies have sought to determine the efficacy of the policy; a search of PubMed for "coronavirus AND (travel restrictions OR travel ban OR shutdown OR cordon sanitaire) AND (Wuhan OR China)" returned 24 results. However other studies have relied on reported cases to determine efficacy, which are likely subject to reporting and testing biases. Early outbreak dynamics are also subject to a significant degree of stochastic uncertainty due to small numbers of cases. Added value of this studyHere we use publicly-available mobility data and a stochastic branching process model to evaluate the efficacy of the cordon sanitaire to limiting the spread of COVID-19 from Wuhan to other cities in mainland China, while accounting for underreporting and uncertainty. We find that although travel restrictions led to a significant decrease in the number of individuals leaving Wuhan during the busy post-Lunar New Year holiday travel period, local transmission was likely already established in major cities. Thus, the travel restrictions likely did not affect the epidemic trajectory substantially in these cities. Implications of all the available evidenceA cordon sanitaire around the epicentre alone may not be able to reduce COVID-19 incidence when implemented after local transmission has occurred in highly connected neighbors. Local non-pharmaceutical interventions to reduce transmissibility (e.g., school and workplace closures) may have contributed more to the observed decrease in incidence in mainland China.
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BackgroundWe evaluated if interventions aimed at air travellers can delay local SARS-CoV-2 community transmission in a previously unaffected country. MethodsWe simulated infected air travellers arriving into countries with no sustained SARS-CoV-2 transmission or other introduction routes from affected regions. We assessed the effectiveness of syndromic screening at departure and/or arrival & traveller sensitisation to the COVID-2019-like symptoms with the aim to trigger rapid self-isolation and reporting on symptom onset to enable contact tracing. We assumed that syndromic screening would reduce the number of infected arrivals and that traveller sensitisation reduces the average number of secondary cases. We use stochastic simulations to account for uncertainty in both arrival and secondary infections rates, and present sensitivity analyses on arrival rates of infected travellers and the effectiveness of traveller sensitisation. We report the median expected delay achievable in each scenario and an inner 50% interval. ResultsUnder baseline assumptions, introducing exit and entry screening in combination with traveller sensitisation can delay a local SARS-CoV-2 outbreak by 8 days (50% interval: 3-14 days) when the rate of importation is 1 infected traveller per week at time of introduction. The additional benefit of entry screening is small if exit screening is effective: the combination of only exit screening and traveller sensitisation can delay an outbreak by 7 days (50% interval: 2-13 days). In the absence of screening, with less effective sensitisation, or a higher rate of importation, these delays shrink rapidly to less than 4 days. ConclusionSyndromic screening and traveller sensitisation in combination may have marginally delayed SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in unaffected countries.